In no case, however, can they, without the neighbour's consent, justify an entry into any dwelling house of his, although the same may be contiguous to the buildings requiring repair.

A tenement is to be considered shut in or landlocked, if its only communication is with a canal, even although public, with a river, or with the sea, or if it is considerably above or below the level of a public way.

In case the parties interested do not agree as to the necessity of the right of way, or upon the manner and conditions of its being exercised, the Court must decide, reconciling so far as it can the requirements of the landlocked tenement, and the usefulness of the way, with the least damage possible being done to the tenement or tenements it crosses.

An original compensation payable in a lump sum is to be allowed to the owner of the tenement crossed, if it is necessary to do away with or alter houses, trees, or bamboo plantations.

Further compensation has to be made by annual payments for loss of use and benefits of cultivation, and for permanent depreciation caused to the servient tenement.

The owner of the dominant tenement can always relinquish his right of way and free himself from the corresponding liability by paying compensation for six months above what is due.

The owner of the servient tenement is also entitled to demand capitalisation by payment to him of an amount similarly calculated, if the person who has to make the annual payments has allowed two years to pass without payment, after having been duly applied to therefor.

Although such flow may have been created or altered by the work of man, yet if more than thirty years have elapsed, or the date at which the same was done is unknown, the servitude cannot be disputed.

If the flow of water to a lower tenement becomes obstructed by accident, the owner of the higher tenement may at his own cost undertake the necessary work to restore the flow to its normal state, but he is under no obligation to do so.

Owners have also no right to place their roofs or terraces so that rain water will fall directly from them on to a neighbouring tenement.

The inhabitants can, moreover, but at their own cost, have any necessary works done on his land for the purpose of collecting and conducting such water, provided that they do not thereby cause any permanent injury to his tenement, and provided that they pay compensation.

They will also have to pay compensation for the user of such water, unless they have already made use of it gratuitously for thirty years.

If, on the other hand, a tenement has water of a like nature flowing through it, the owner can alter its course within his own land for the same purposes, provided that he restores it to its natural course at its exit from his tenement.

In both cases the riparian owners have the right to fish, upon complying with local regulations.

In case they fail to have the cleansing done at the times fixed by the local authorities, the same is to be done by such authorities at the cost of the owners.

The share which each owner has to contribute is to be recovered in the same manner as other local contributions.

If an embankment, recognized as necessary for a locality, affects the interests of several riparian owners, and they cannot settle among themselves how it is to be made, it can be made by the local authorities at the expense, in manner above mentioned, of all the owners interested.

If the water for which passage is claimed has been polluted by its being used for domestic, agricultural, or industrial purposes, only an underground passage can be insisted on for it.

In no case can it be claimed through buildings, nor through court yards or gardens appurtenant to dwelling houses.

Under like conditions, he can also claim for the passage of his own water the right to make use of any works that have been made on his land by the owner of the dominant tenement.

In cither case the one making use of works made by the other must contribute to the cost of their construction and maintenance in proportion to the advantages derived from them.

Where an owner, who has not made the dam, has the right to make use of the same water, he can avail himself of the dam for his own benefit by sharing the cost in manner mentioned in the preceding article.

It also cannot be brought in respect of lands that arc separated from each other by a public road or public water course.

Nevertheless, if one of the neighbouring owners relies upon acquisitive prescription, or even upon possession for a year of all or part of the tenement for the benefit of which the marking out of the boundaries is claimed, the claimant must first take proceedings either by way of revendication or for redintegration.

If upon taking the sum total of the contents of all such tenements there is an excess or a deficiency, the gain or loss is to be divided amongst all the tenements in proportion to their size.

In default of mutual agreement, a judgment, with plan annexed, must be rendered defining the said contents and limits; the boundary marks are to be pointed out, not only by mentioning how far distant they are one from the other, but also their distance in relation to some other fixed points in the locality.

The expenses of survey, as well as of documents and other proceedings, arc to be defrayed by all the parties interested in proportion to the size of their respective tenements.

Nevertheless, the expenses of proceedings, which specially relate to a claim that has been decided to be groundless, are to be borne by the losing party.

If his tenement is subject to a servitude, whether created by law or by. the act of man, which gives a right of entry or a right of way to a neighbouring owner, the means to make use of the servitude must be duly cared for.

Apart from express agreement the enclosure can only be demanded in thin boards, or in bamboos placed touching each other.

The height is to be six feet at least measured from the surface at the line of separation.

If one tenement forms a terrace above the other, the enclosure is to be placed on such tenement, but need only be of a height necessary to made up six feet in all; it can. however, be in no case less than three feet.

Nevertheless, if one owner thinks that it is to his advantage to have an enclosure made in different material or of greater height than that above laid down, he may always have the same done upon mere payment of the difference in cost of construction, but in this case the whole cost of maintenance and repair will have to be borne by him alone.

The same applies to walls in stone, brick, or masonry, separating the buildings of neighbouring owners, and to ditches, hedges, and fences, that have been dug out, or planted, or made at joint expense on the line that divides contiguous lands.

In these four cases the exclusive right of ownership is to be presumed to belong to that owner on whose side such special work has been done, or whose tenement is completely enclosed.

Such presumption docs not apply to any part of such wall, if it supports only one of the buildings.

Nevertheless, and provided an enclosure, such as is by Art. 267 rendered obligatory, is not in question, either owner may, upon paying for any repairs that he has rendered necessary, relieve himself of his liability for maintenance by renouncing his right to have the separation considered party-property, but he cannot do so if it happens to be a wall that supports a building belonging to him.

Each co-owner may also raise the height of a party wall if its strength will admit of his so doing, or if he has done at his own expense such work as may be required to give it the strength needed; in this case the part added on is not party-property.

In the case of a party-ditch, each neighbouring owner can conduct into it rain water, or water used for industrial or domestic purposes, or artificially collected, provided the ditch has a sufficient slope to prevent an injurious state of stagnation arising in consequence.

In the case of a hedge, the owners are to share equally the wood cut, and can respectively require that any trees in it of tall growth should be cut down.

The same applies to so much of a wall, as is the result of heightening in manner mentioned in the third paragraph of the preceding article.

Any one, who has thus made a wall party-property, can make use of it in the manner mentioned in the preceding article; but he is not at liberty to close up any openings in it if they have been created servitudes of view by the act of man.

This provision does not apply to warehouses (kura or dozo).

A view, which is obtained from a building or construction parallel to the line of separation, or which is at an angle of not more than 45 degrees (an eighth of a circle) off the parallel, is to be considered as a full view.

Other views, called oblique or side views, which are obtained at an angle of from 46 to 90 degrees, can be made at a distance of one foot from the line of separation.

The distance in both cases is to be calculated from the line of separation to the part, which is furthest forward, of the particular work of construction that gives the view.

In the event of it being impossible to put up a screen, only openings called sufferance lights can be made, the bottom part of which must be six feet at least above the floor, and which must have a fixed grating or framing in iron or wood, between the bars or meshes of which there must not be an interval of more than one inch at the most.

Even in this latter case the neighbouring owner can insist on a screen, if he is willing that the same should project over the line of separation by a foot or more.

Three feet of space will suffice in the case of a cellar that is dry and covered over.

In the case of a trench, small canal, or mere ditch, intended for the passage of water, the space must be equal to at least a half of its depth, but it need not exceed three feet ; such ditch must, however, be cut with a slope inclining away from the dividing line, or must be supported with a facing of stone or of wood.

Trees, less than three ken but more than one ken high, must not be nearer to it than two feet.

Other trees or shrubs may grow right up to the line of separation In all cases the neighbouring owner can require the owner of such trees to lop off branches which reach beyond the line of separation; he may himself cut away any roots which stretch into his tenement.

They are, however, applicable, notwithstanding that the separation between the two tenements is party-property.

They are not applicable to public property, with respect to any thing that has to be submitted to, but can be availed of for its benefit,

A servitude, of which the principal obligation is the personal doing of something by an owner or any person placed upon his tenement, as well as a servitude the chief benefit from which is personal to the owner or those who are his substitutes, is not to be considered as a real servitude : the first is to be treated as a personal right to services, the second as a real right of user or of lease, but without prejudice to what is mentioned in the second paragraph of Art. 305.

Beneficial servitudes cannot lie assigned, leased, or mortgaged, separately from the dominant estate; neither can they be burdened with another servitude.

Similarly in the case of partition of a tenement, or of the assignment of part of a tenement, they affect undividedly each part of it, if it be servient, or benefit each part of it, if it be dominant, unless it so happens that they could only be usefully exercised against a portion of it, if the tenement be servient, or could only confer some benefit on a portion of it, if it be dominant.

On the other hand, the owner of a tenement, which is alleged to be servient, can bring a negatory action, either possessory or |petitory, to prevent or put a stop to the exercise of the servitude he disputes.

In both cases the rules and distinctions established in the Chapter on Possession are to be observed.

The rights, benefits, and obligations of a usufructuary, and of a lessee, in relation to servitudes, arc established in Arts. 69, 70, 99. 144, and 151.

They arc created, exercised, and extinguished in the manner in the three following subsections mentioned.

They are discontinuous, when, in order to be of use to the dominant tenement, they have need of some present act of man.

In the contrary case they arc non-apparent.

They are negative :

In either case the ordinary rules governing the alienation of real immovable rights, either gratuitously or onerously, arc to be observed in order to give them validity, both as between the parties themselves, as well as with regard to third persons.

If the right to take water from a neighbouring tenement is in question, the time for prescription only begins to run from the time when the owners, who bases his title upon it, has made, cither u|upon his own tenement, or on the servient tenement, some apparent work for the purpose of collecting and conducting such water for his own benefit.

Moreover, if the servitude has been created by a title, the general rules governing the interpretation of contracts and wills are to be observed ; if it has been acquired by prescription, its extent is to be measured by the extent of effective possession ; if it results from the mere intention of the owner, its extent is to be determined according to the presumed intention of the person creating it.

In making such arrangement, the Court should take into consideration the respective requirements of the two tenements and should ascertain what have been the consequences of the previous exercise of the servitude.

In case there is not sufficient water for the requirements of both tenements, what is needed for personal and domestic use is to be first taken, and then what is needed for agricultural in preference to industrial wants; but in every case in proportion to the importance of the tenements.

If there arc several dominant tenements they are to stand on the same footing with respect to the use of water for domestic requirements ; in respect of agricultural and industrial requirements, however, preference is to be given to that tenement whose right is of longest standing.

On the other hand, if the owner of the servient tenement has a legitimate interest in a change of like nature, and the owner of the dominant tenement will not sustain any injury thereby, he is entitled to ask for and obtain the same.

It can, however, be agreed that the owner of the servient tenement is to be responsible for maintenance and repairs, even although there may have been no fault on his part ; but in such case such owner can always free himself from his responsibility by abandoning in favour of the owner of the dominant tenement that part of the servient tenement, which is burdened with the servitude.

He has even the right to make use of works constructed on his tenement for the purpose of exercising the servitude, provided be contributes to the expense of their making or maintenance in proportion respectively to the use they are to him, and the increase of expenditure which is entailed in consequence.

Renunciation can only be effective if the person renouncing has capacity to alienate his rights to immovables.

If there is question of a continued and apparent servitude, and, the disposition of the premises having remained unchanged, the tenements, no matter at what time or for what cause, become again separated, the servitude comes again into existence in accordance with Art. 297.

Such thirty years commence to run from the last occasion of user, in the case of a discontinuous servitude, and from the time when any material hindrance to its spontaneous working has occurred, if it be a continuous servitude.

In cither case, if the hindrance to the user of the servitude is the result of an accident that has happened on the servient tenement, the owner of the dominant tenement is entitled to receive permission to re-establish, at his own cost, the previously existing state of things; if the hindrance has been caused by the act of the owner of the servient tenement, such re-establishment is to be made at his cost.

In addition, the causes which suspend or interrupt the running of liberatory prescription are applicable to non-user of servitudes.

A contract is bilateral or synallagmatic when the parties mutually obligate themselves ;

It is unilateral when one or more of the parties to it are obligated towards one or more of the others without reciprocity.

A contract is onerous or for consideration when each party to it sacrifices something in favor of the other or in favor of a third party.

It is gratuitous or of beneficence when one of the parties to it receives some benefit from the other without himself supplying any benefit in return.

A contract is consensual when it only requires for its formation the consent of the parties to it;

It is real when it requires in addition to such consent delivery of the thing which is the subject matter of the contract.

A contract is solemn when consent to it must be given in a public or authenticated instrument in writing.

It is not solemn in all other cases.

A contract is sure when, from the time of entering into it, its existence and results arc certain;

It is aleatory, when its existence, or all or part of its results, are contingent on the happening of an event which depends on chance.

A contract is principal when its existence is independent of that of another contract.

It is accessory in the contrary case.

Nullity of a principal contract carries with it that of its accessory contract, unless the accessory contract has been entered into with the object of taking effect on the nullity of the principal contract.

Nullity of an accessory contract does not carry with it that of its principal contract, unless the parties have treated the two contracts as indivisible.

Named contracts are those which have a special designation and form the subject of special provisions in this Code or in the Commercial Code; they arc, however, also governed by the rules of this Second Part, in so far as there is nothing said to the contrary in the provisions which have reference to them.

Nameless contracts are subject to the general rules here laid down; the special rules governing named contracts can also be applied to nameless contracts by applying those that govern the contracts with which they have most analogy.

In addition to the above essentials solemn agreements or contracts can have no existence, unless the required solemnities have been observed, and real contracts no existence unless the thing to be restored has been delivered.

Insufficiency of consideration does not of itself vitiate agreements, except in the cases determined by law.

Absence of consent on the part of any one of them prevents any agreement as between the others being formed, unless there is proof of a contrary intent.

Consent may also under certain circumstances be given tacitly.

When the party making an offer or proposal dies or becomes deprived of capacity to contract, an acceptance of the same by the other party is valid so long as such fact has not come to his knowledge.

Where a time has been named for acceptance, an offer is withdrawn as of course by the mere expiration of such time.

Mistakes occurring by post or telegram are at the risk of the sendor, but without prejudice to his right of recourse against the authorities, if grounds exist.

Mistake in the reasons which have prompted an agreement is never in itself a ground of nullity, except in so far as is herein subsequently provided when there has been fraud of one of the parties.

Mistake with respect to the person of the other party to the contract renders the agreement absolutely null and void in cases in which the personality of the party is the determining cause of the agreement, as in contracts of beneficence.

An agreement is voidable, but not void, on the ground of mistake with respect to the person, when the personality of the individual has been but a secondary cause for the agreement, as in an onerous contract which involves risk of the debtor's insolvency, or in an obligation to keep and take care of the thing forming the subject matter of the agreement.

Substantial qualities of things are to be presumed, unless there be proof to the contrary, to have been considered in the intention of the parties as principal qualities.

Non-substantial qualities, on the contrary, are not to be considered as principal, unless the intention of the parties has been expressed to such effect, or unless such intention can be clearly inferred from the circumstances.

The same applies to abstract or metaphysical qualities of things, such as their antiquity, their origin, or the purpose for which they arc intended.

Mistake in calculation, or in name, date, or place, is governed by Art. 582.

Nevertheless, the Courts are not to admit the nullity of an agreement for mistake in law except under great reserve, and unless such mistake was under the circumstances excusable.

Mistake in law is never to be admitted in order to exonerate the parties to an agreement from any penalty, from any legal forfeiture which is the result of time, or from any nullity arising from violation of the prescribed forms for documents, nor is it, as a general rule, to be admitted, if it relates to ignorance of legal provisions which concern public order.

In other cases it only constitutes ground for an action for damages against the person who has perpetrated it.

Nevertheless, if the author of the fraud is the other party to the agreement, and if his fraudulent proceedings have been such, that without them the party who has been deceived would not have entered into the same, the latter can, on the ground of right to reparation, obtain the nullification of the agreement, as well as damages, if any have been sustained.

In this case the nullification of the agreement is not to prejudice the rights of third parties who have acted in good faith.

The same is the case where an unfair or rash promise has been given, or an unreasonable alienation has been made by any one in order to escape from imminent danger, even though arising from causes independent of the will of man, and which deprived him of the power of deliberation.

Duress only vitiates consent if the actual force, threats, or danger, were capable of being resisted, but have induced the party to make the agreement in order to avoid a more serious, more immediate, or more proximate injury, cither to his own person or property, or to the person or property of another.

In the case of other persons whether relatives, relations by marriage, or strangers, the Courts are to take into consideration, according to the circumstances, the influence that the threats directed against such persons have had on the consent of the contracting party.

If the duress has not actually caused the making of the agreement, but has only produced the acceptance of disadvantageous terms, the agreement is to be upheld subject to payment of an indemnity.

Means belonging to both parties to an agreement by which they can obtain its nullification do not reciprocally destroy each other, even although they may be founded on reciprocal wrongful acts, except upon payment of such damages, if any, as have been sustained.

Nevertheless, incapacity resulting from a penal sentence can be relied on by persons who have contracted with the person convicted.

Other cases of tacit confirmation and the forms which express confirmation is to take are determined in the same Section.

No agreement can, however, be entered into which gives or takes away rights to a succession not yet opened, even although the consent of the person whose succession is concerned has been obtained, unless it be in one of the cases expressly excepted by law.

A promise that a third person, over whom the person promising has no authority, will do or refrain from doing something, although such doing or abstention is lawful or possible, is to be considered as a promise to do something impossible.

Nevertheless, a person is at liberty by expressly so stating to guarantee the doing or refraining from doing something by a third party, in which case the person promising becomes subject to the obligations which attach to sureties.

A person may also agree to make himself liable for the fulfilment of a penal clause providing for the case of a third party failing to perform a promise that he has made for him.

If the promisor has only undertaken to obtain the ratification of an engagement entered into by him in the name of a third party, he is released from his obligation so soon as such third party has ratified it.

A promise is to be considered as without appreciable interest for the promisee, when it is made for the benefit of a third party, and is not accompanied by a penal clause.

Nevertheless, a promise in the interest of another is valid if it is a condition accessory to a promise that has been made to the promisee in his own interest or to any gift made by him.

In either case the non-performance of the condition only gives to the promisee the right to bring an action either for cancellation of the agreement, or for fulfilment of the stipulated penal clause.

Similarly, a principal or accessory promise can be made so as to bind one or more of the heirs of the promisor.

They can only be rescinded by mutual consent of the parties, except in those cases in which the law authorizes rescission at the will of one party alone.

Agreements must be performed in good faith.

The expenses of removal to be borne by the promisee.

The expenses of the instrument of title arc, if the agreement be onerous, to be borne by both parties, if it be gratuitous, by the beneficiary.

Delivery of immovables is effected by handing over the title-deeds and evacuating the premises; without prejudice, however, to what is said in Art. 203 with regard to constructive delivery and possessory declaration.

Delivery of rights of claim is effected by handing over the documents of title.

If no time has been fixed for delivery, it can be demanded forthwith.

If no place has been designated for delivery, it is be made at the place where the subject matter was at the time the agreement was entered into, if the same is some specified object, and at the place where the selection and appropriation have been arrived at, if it is something fungible ; in other cases it is to be made at the domicile of the debtor.

In the case, however, of a gratuitous alienation, the promisor is only bound to devote to the custody of the subject matter the same care as he exercises towards his own property.

Other exceptional cases, in which a debtor is only bound to exercise a similar amount of care, are provided for when treating of the contracts that give rise to them.

Such loss is, nevertheless, to be borne by the promisor, if he is in arrear in delivery, and if the thing in question would not necessarily have perished or become deteriorated if it had been delivered.

For this purpose they are to proceed either by way of execution, by intervening in actions already begun either by or against their debtor, or by indirect action against third parties by virtue of a judicial order of subrogation obtained in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Creditors cannot, however, make use of purely legal powers which belong to their debtor, or rights exclusively reserved to him personally, nor take in execution property declared by law or by agreement to be not liable to seizure.

Fraud exists when the debtor cither diminishes his assets or increases his liabilities with the knowledge that by so doing he will prejudice his creditors.

, If the debtor has fraudulently allowed cither judgment to be given against him in an action to which he was defendant, or a claim brought by him to be dismissed, the creditors are to proceed by means of third party opposition according to the Code of Civil Procedure.

In every case the debtor must be made a party to the proceedings.

If revocation of what has been done cannot be specifically obtained from the defendants, they are to be ordered to pay damages to the creditors.

A revocatory action in respect of an alienation can be brought against persons who, with a knowledge of the fraud committed on creditors, have acquired their title either onerously or gratuitously from the person who originally acquired title from the debtor.

This provision applies also to third party opposition.

(b) THE EFFECT OF AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THIRD PARTIES.

This disposition is applicable in the case of credits to bearer.

Acceptance by the debtor estops him from setting up against the assignee all exceptions or pleas in bar which he might have set up against the assignor: a simple notification only deprives him of such exceptions in so far as they have arisen since the date on which it was made.

Until one of the above mentioned acts has been performed, all payments made by the debtor, agreements of release entered into with him, executions issued at the instance of creditors of the assignor or oppositions lodged by them, and new accretions to the credit, provided that the same have been duly notified or accepted, are to be presumed as having been made in good faith and can be set up against the assignee, who has neglected to take the proper steps to protect his rights.

Bad faith on the part of persons interested can only lie proved by their admission of the same, or by their refusal to swear to its non-existence in judicial proceedings ; if, however, there has been fraud in concert with the assignor, such collusion can be established by any of the ordinary means of proof.

Special rules with respect to the assignment of commercial securities by means of indorsement are contained in the Commercial Code.

Special rules with reference to the publicity to be given to mortgages and privileged preferences over immovables are contained in Book IV.

Art. 368(bis).— Transcription can, by virtue of a regulation, be replaced by depositing at the transcription office duplicate originals of the document to be made public. These, after having been duly compared and found identical, are to be marked with the transcription stamp by placing half the same in the margin of each sheet of each of them.

One of such originals is to be kept at the said office and a note made of its contents in a special register; the other is to be returned to the party interested with a note in the margin of the place and day on which the deposit was made.

Other formalities relating to transcription are determined by special regulations and by the Code of Civil Procedure.

A certificate of the transcription, containing an extract of the principal dispositions of the instrument transcribed, is to be given to the applicant.

Any person is at liberty, upon payment of the fees, to apply for an extract of the transcription register concerning such immovables as he specifies.

Bad faith and collusion can be proved in the manner in Art. 367 mentioned.

If such actions may be brought so as to include all subacquirers without distinction, the petition is not to be entertained by the Court until it has been noted in the margin of the transcription of the instrument attacked.

A judgment annulling an instrument must also be noted underneath the note of the petition before it is put in force, even provisionally ; this must be done in every case, under penalty of payment of a fine of not less than to yen nor more than too yen by the party who has obtained the judgment, within one month from the time at which it became no longer liable to be attacked.

If the petition is dismissed, or found to be barred by prescription, the Court is to order, of its own motion, the note of the petition to be struck out, and such order is to be carried into effect, so soon as the judgment dismissing the petition, or declaring it barred by prescription, has become no longer subject to attack.

If the plaintiff discontinues his action, the note of the petition is to be struck out on the application of any party interested.

Such transcription is to be noted by the keeper of the register as a matter of course in the margin of the transcription of the instrument annulled.

The petition and judgment arc to be noted in the margin of the transcription of the instrument contested, in the manner, and under the conditions, in Arts. 372 mentioned.

Persons with legal capacity, or those without capacity if duly represented or aided, can, without recourse to the Courts being necessary, consent to such erasure or rectification.

Erasures or rectifications duly ordered by the Courts, or consented to without recourse to the Courts, cannot be set up against those persons who have had their rights properly transcribed or entered, unless these latter have been called upon to contest the same, or unless they have acquiesced in them.

Subsection 4. The Interpretation or Agreements.

Where an expression is, in itself, susceptible of two meanings, it is to be understood according to that which is most adapted to the nature and object of the agreement.

If a clause is susceptible of two meanings, but only one of them would render such clause effective, it is to be interpreted according to such meaning, and not according to the meaning which would render it ineffective.

If the agreement is synallagmatic, the rule here laid down is to be separately applied to each clause that is ambiguous or obscure.

Such term is called legal, when it is cither fixed by the parties or is allowed by law.

If it has been said that the debtor will pay “when able” or “when he sees fit”, the Court, on the application of the creditor, and upon a consideration of the circumstances and the presumed intention of the parties, is to fix a period of time for his so doing; without prejudice, however, to the case of the parties having intended to establish a periodical payment in perpetuity.

The case of a party paying by mistake before expiry of the term is governed by Art. 386.

The Courts can also, under like circumstances, authorize execution for payment of the debt by instalments.

Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

The time of grace cannot be enlarged by the Court.

Real rights, both principal and accessory, can also be subject to a suspensive or resolutory condition.

The fulfilment of a resolutory condition places the parties in the state in which they respectively were prior to the agreement.

Such condition, however, cannot be set up by one party or those claiming under him against persons claiming under the other, unless such condition has been brought to the notice of these latter by such public means as are prescribed by Art. 367 and following articles.

With respect to judgments rendered between third persons and the party whose right is liable to be cancelled, the same can be relied on by the other party or those claiming under him, but they cannot be set up against them, unless they have been called upon to resist the action.

The above does not apply, however, to judgments which only refer to acts of management.

A condition is illicit, when it is either to benefit a party for doing something that is prohibited or for abstaining from performing some duty, or is to work to his prejudice for not doing something that he is prohibited from doing or for doing something that he is in duty bound to do.

If an impossible or illicit condition only affects some accessory consequence of an agreement, the clause which is dependent on it is to be considered as not existing.

A negative condition limited by a fixed time is to be deemed as fulfilled when the contemplated event has not happened within the time fixed; it is also to be deemed as fulfilled, whether a time has been fixed or not, so soon as it has become certain that the event cannot happen.

In neither case can the time fixed by the parties be enlarged by the Court.

This applies also with respect to the consequences that partial fulfilment may produce.

On the other hand, if the promise or assignment has been made subject to a resolutory condition, such loss or deterioration is to be borne by the promisee or assignee, and his right thereby becomes irrevocable without his being entitled to demand any return.

Where, in such cases, the loss or deterioration does hot exceed half the value, fulfilment of the condition will produce the agreed on consequences.

In this case cancellation does not take place as of course : it must be applied for judicially by the aggrieved party; the Court can, however, grant to the other a time of grace in manner mentioned in Art. 426.

They can also expressly agree that it shall take place as of course against the party who lias been constituted in arrear in performance ; such party cannot, however, avail himself of the cancellation thus effected, until the other party has had resort to it as against him.

An obligation is to be still deemed simple although it may have for subject matter several different prestations, whether simultaneous or successive, provided that the same are due by virtue of only one agreement, or of agreements connected with each other.

In these different cases the debtor is only discharged by prestation of every thing that is due.

The choice of the thing to be given rests with the debtor, unless it has been specially allowed to the creditor.

The debtor cannot, however, force the creditor to receive, nor can the creditor force the debtor to give, parts of the different things due in the alternative.

Where both the things have perished one after the other by fault of the debtor, he owes the value of that which has perished the last.

If they have perished simultaneously and the debtor is in fault with respect to both or only one of them, the right of choice is transferred to the creditor to obtain the value of either the one or the other.

If both the things have perished through the fault of the creditor, the debtor can at his choice obtain reimbursement of the value of either the one or the other.

If both the things have perished simultaneously, the one through the fault of the creditor, the other through some fortuitous event, the debtor is discharged without right of repetition against the creditor.

If both have perished through the fault of the debtor, the creditor has the choice of the value of either the one or the other.

He has a like choice if both things have perished simultaneously, the one through the fault of the debtor, the other through some fortuitous event.

If both have perished simultaneously through the fault of the creditor, the choice is transferred to the debtor to obtain the value of either the one or the other.

In the same case of simultaneous loss, if one of the things has perished through the fault of the creditor and the other by some fortuitous event, the debtor is discharged without right of repetition against the creditor.

If both the things have totally perished the obligation is extinguished.

Where, through inevitable accident or irresistible force, one of the two things has become deteriorated or lost to more than a half of its value, it can no longer form an object of choice for the debtor.

The right of choice once validly exercised, whether by the debtor by means of an actual offer or by the creditor by means of a demand in due form, cannot be withdrawn, except with the consent of the other party.

The thing directly due is to be deemed due subject to the resolutory condition of payment of the thing that is optionally due.

If the thing directly due has perished through the fault of the debtor, he is liable for payment of its value with damages, but he preserves the power of discharging himself by giving the thing that is optionally due.

If one of the two things has perished through the fault of the crediter, the debtor is entitled to claim his discharge, or else to give the thing that remains and obtain compensation for that which has perished.

If both the things have perished through the fault of the creditor, the debtor is discharged, and can obtain reimbursement of the value of either the one or the other at his choice.

If both the things have perished simultaneously, the one through some fortuitous event, the other through the fault of the creditor, without it being known which has perished through the latter, the debtor is discharged with a right of repetition against the creditor for the value of the one or the other at his choice.

A multiple obligation is in common, or joint and several; it may also be indivisible, as mentioned in the following subsection.

In a joint and several obligation each creditor can claim and each debtor can be sued for the whole, cither in his own name and on his own behalf, or in the name and an behalf of the others; without prejudice, however, to the resjiectivc rights of recourse, by means of an action on the ground of guaranty, for whatever may have been received or paid by any one in excess of his actual share, in the manner explained in Book IV.

If such parts cannot be thus determined, they are to be deemed equal, and are to be calculated by the number of creditors or debtors, hut without prejudice to any subsequent right of recourse for the purpose of finally settling each person's share in the benefit of the credit or in the burden of the debt.

A joint and several obligation is similarly divisible amongst the heirs of the parties.

In like manner, any debtor, who has alone performed such an obligation, has a right of recourse on the ground of guaranty against the other debtors for the respective shares that, by reason of the obligation or their respective prior relations to each other, they ought to contribute.

If any creditor has made a novation, or released a debt, or made any other agree ment which in any way discharges the debtors or any of them or if there exist against any creditor grounds for legal set off the other creditors can still demand integral performance of the obligation, but they will have to make allowance to the defendant debtor forsuch value as they would have had to account for to the creditor himself if he had not lost his right, as mentioned in the 4th paragraph of Art. 523, the 2nd paragraph of Art. 537, and the 4th and 5th paragraphs of Art. 543, and subject to the distinctions therein made.

In like manner, legal grounds for the suspension of prescription in respect of one of them suspend it also with respect to the others.

Payment can also be made, either in the name of the debtor or in his own name, by a third person who is not interested.

Neither is it necessary that the debtor should consent to payment being made by a third party, although not interested ; nevertheless, if in this latter case neither the debtor nor the creditor consent to the payment, it cannot be made.

If a thing belonging to a stranger has been delivered, the payment can be treated as void by cither of the parties.

If a thing has been delivered by an owner without legal capacity to alienate the same, he alone can claim to have the payment treated as void.

The debtor cannot in cither case claim the return of the thing delivered, unless he tenders a valid payment.

Repetition is no longer open to him if the creditor has in good faith consumed or alienated movables received in payment.

The creditor can, however, ratify a payment made with a thing belonging to another, without prejudice, in case of revendication by the rightful owner, to his right of action on ground of guaranty against the debtor.

The following are considered as in possession of a claim : the heir or other apparent general successor, the apparent assignee of a nominative claim, the holder of an instrument in writing payable to bearer.

On the other hand a debtor cannot be required to give any thing other than that which he owes, notwithstanding that the thing demanded may be of less value.

If a thing by nature fungible and determined only by its kind is in question, the debtor is not bound to give the best quality nor the creditor to receive the worst.

If the object has been preserved or improved at the cost of the debtor, or has become deteriorated by his fault or neglect, an indemnity is respectively payable by the parties in conformity with Chapter 1, Sections II and III.

The debtor is never liable for either more or less than the numerical sum promised, whatever may be the legal changes that have occurred in the nominal value of money or in its intrinsic composition.

Any agreement to an effect contrary to either of the two preceding provisions is null and void: without prejudice, however, to what is said in the second paragraph of Art. 486.

The same applies if the sum due has been stipulated as payable in gold or in silver money If it has been agreed that payment is to be made in foreign money, the debtor can always, in manner mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, discharge himself by paying its value in any legal money he may select.

If the party at whose domicile payment has to be made has changed the same without fraudulent intent, payment must be made at the new domicile, but the difference in exchange and supplementary expenses consequent on the travelling of persons, or on the carriage of the things due, can be deducted by the other party.

All other expenses of payment are to be borne by the debtor.

If the day fixed for payment is a legal holiday, payment cannot be demanded until the day next following.

a debtor cannot, however, without the consent of the creditor, make an appropriation in favor of a debt not yet due, when the time allowed for payment has been introduced for the benefit ol the latter, nor in favor of capital in preference to expenses and interest, nor in favor of parts of several debts.

If the debtor has accepted the receipt without objection or reservation, he is not at liberty to take exception to the appropriation, unless there has been mistake on his part, or fraud or deceit on the part of the creditor.

2. If the thing due is a specified object and is deliverable at the place where it is, the debtor is to notify the creditor to take it away;

3. If the specified object is deliverable at the domicile of the creditor or in some other place, and its transport is expensive, difficult, or perilous, the debtor is to declare in his tender that he is prepared to deliver it forthwith according to the terms of his agreement;

4. The same applies in the case of things of quantity;

5. In the case of an obligation to do something requiring the presence or the co-operation of the creditor, it is sufficient for the debtor to declare that he is ready to perform his obligation.

It prevents the person making it from being constituted in arrear ; if the same has already taken place, it stops for the future the consequences arising therefrom; it also stops compensatory interest from running.

In the case of a specified object or of a thing of quantity, the debtor must apply to the Court to name a place for its deposit and to appoint a person as its sequestrator or custodian.

The forms to be followed and the other conditions respecting deposit are provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure.

Nevertheless, so long as the creditor has not accepted the deposit, or so long as it has not, upon application of the debtor, being declared valid by a judgment which is no longer subject to attack, the latter can withdraw it, and his discharge is to be regarded as not having been effected.

Notwithstanding acceptance by the creditor, or the judgment declaring it valid having become final, the debtor may still withdraw the deposit with the consent of the creditor; without prejudice, however, to the discharge of co-debtors and sureties, to the extinction of rights of pledge or mortgage, or to attachments levied by third parties in right of the creditor upon the things deposited.

Subrogation is conferred by the creditor, by the debtor, or by law, according to the following distinctions.

For this purpose, the document of loan must mention the object for which the same is made, and the receipt must state the source from which the money or things given in payment are obtained.

Only documents duly authenticated or bearing a specified date are to be admitted as proof of such a transaction in so far as third parties arc concerned.

Nevertheless, if a longer interval of time than is necessary has elapsed between the loan and payment, the Courts may declare that no subrogation has taken place.

Nevertheless, the creditor alone can exercise the right of cancellation of the contract for default of payment in full.

If he has only received part payment, he must permit the person subrogated such liberty of access to the documents of title as he may require, and must permit him to look after the safe keeping of any pledge.

Contracts of sale are subject to the general rules governing onerous and synallagmatic contracts, in so far as the same do not conflict with the provisions hereinafter contained.

They can, however, make it dependent on the preparation of a contract in writing. or under private seal, in duplicate original, which is to serve as proof thereof for each party.

Art, 663.— A unilateral promise to sell or a unilateral promise to buy received and accepted binds the promisor, in conformity with Art. 329, to enter into a contract according to the price and conditions specified in the promise, as soon as the promisee so requires.

If no time has been expressly or impliedly fixed for acceptance, the promisor can apply for a time to be fixed by the Court after the expiration of which the promise is to be considered as not made, unless the promisee has meanwhile demanded its fulfilment.

Such judgment in the case of the sale of immovable rights must be transcribed.

Where the promise of sale has been transcribed as such, the judgment is to be noted in the margin of such transcription, and will have a retroactive effect against those claiming through the vendor.

The Court, in such a case, has also power, by interpreting the intention of the parties, to decide that the promise of sale was equivalent to actual and immediate sale, and, if a period of lime has been named, that the same applies only to performance.

Sales of commodities that it is customary to taste are to be presumed made subject to the suspensive condition that they meet with approval.

It can, however, be fixed by reference to the present or future commercial quotation for like goods, or left to the valuation of a third party named in the contract.

In this latter case, the valuation can be disputed if it is manifestly erroneous or contrary to equity ; but such objection must be raised by the party aggrieved as soon as he becomes aware of the valuation.

If there has been concerted fraud between such third person and one of the parties, Arts. 333 and 566 are applicable.

The price fixed by the parties can consist either of a lump sum, or of an annuity in perpetuity or for life ; where, however, it is fixed by a third party, it can only consist of a lump sum, unless the parties have expressly given to such arbitrator more extended powers.

Husband and wife can, however, give things by way of payment the one to the other in the case of one of them having to extinguish a true and legal debt owing to the other.

In such case, the giving in payment is not valid and complete between the parties, until the Civil Court, on being satisfied of its legality, has confirmed the same.

Where it has for subject-matter a real immovable right, it will not be valid with respect to third parties, unless the said confirmation has been noted in the transcription of the document.

The same prohibition applies to public officials entrusted by law with the conduct of public sales or with presiding thereat.

The same prohibition applies to advocates and to notaries in respect of rights in dispute, which may be submitted to the Court within whose jurisdiction they practise.

The person to whose prejudice the disputed rights have been assigned can, if he prefers, take over the assignment of the said rights by reimbursing the assignee the actual price of assignment together with interest thereon from the date of payment.

Without prejudice in either case, however, to the disciplinary punishment of the offenders.

The invalidity of such sale can be relied on by either party, by way of plea as well as by way of action.

Where the fact of prohibition has been concealed by the fraud of one of the parties, such party can be ordered to pay damages.

Nevertheless, such invalidity can only be relied on by the vendor, if he was unaware at the time of sale that the thing belonged to some one else.

Rules with respect to the bringing of actions and setting up of pleas, the return of the price, and the compensation due by the vendor are laid down in the following Section, when considering the subject of guaranty against eviction.

Where the thing had at such time only perished in part, the purchaser, if he was unaware of such fact, has the option of either cancelling the sale on establishing that what remains is not sufficient for his requirements, or of maintaining it subject to a proportional reduction in the price; without prejudice, however, in either case to damages, if the vendor has been in fault.

An action for cancellation cannot be brought after six months, or an action for reduction of price after two years, from the time that the purchaser became aware of the partial loss; without prejudice, however, to cases where there has been express or implied ratification.

For the same purpose, Arts. 366 and 367 are applicable to the case of sales of corporeal movables and rights of claim.

The obligation to keep the thing is governed by Art. 354.

In the absence of any agreement as to time and place of delivery, the sixth and seventh paragraphs of Art. 353 are to be applied.

Nevertheless, the vendor can retain possession until payment of the price, unless the purchaser has by agreement obtained further time for payment.

The vendor can, however, delay delivery, notwithstanding that he may have granted time for payment, if the purchaser has been declared bankrupt or has become insolvent since the sale, or if he concealed the fact of his being in an insolvent condition prior to the sale.

Nevertheless, he may be bound to cede more and the purchaser may be bound to take more, in the cases and under the distinctions mentioned in the following articles.

If the actual extent is in excess of that declared, the purchaser must pay a proportionate increase of price.

Mention that “the extent is not guaranteed.” or that “the extent is only approximate,” docs not lessen the liability of a vendor who has acted in bad faith.

In the case of an excess, the purchaser has not to pay any increased price unless the excess is one-twentieth or more.

This distinction is also to be applied to cases where different parts of one and the same property are different in nature and the extent of each part has been stated.

Where, in the case of excess, the purchaser has to pay an increase of one-twentieth or more in the price, he may withdraw unconditionally from the contract.

Such time runs, for the vendor, from the date of the contract, and for the purchaser from the date of delivery, or from the date of payment in full of the agreed on price, if the same has taken place prior to delivery.

He is not bound to submit to any reduction in the amount recoverable, notwithstanding that the thing may have diminished in value, unless such diminution has resulted from fraud on his part or he has derived benefit therefrom.

When the purchaser receives back the price he has paid, he must restore to the vendor possession of the thing.

The purchaser can, however, if he so prefers, demand in lieu and instead of such fruits, legal interest during a corresponding period on his price of purchase.

A purchaser in good faith can also claim any other damages to which he can in conformity with general principles of law, show himself entitled, such as costs incurred by him in defending an action of revendication by the owner as well as those of his own action on ground of guaranty.

In this latter case the vendor by depositing after tender the amount so estimated with the price received is protected from any further liability, whenever an action on ground of guaranty is brought.

Where the vendor has, in the terms of Art. 500, exercised his right to uplift the sums deposited, he cannot a second time avail himself of the advantages conferred by this article.

The same right belongs to the true owner who has become heir of the vendor of a thing belonging to another, and to any one who has succeeded to troth of them.

Where the purchaser does not obtain cancellation of the contract, he is to be indemnified to the extent of the direct and actual loss sustained.

If he does not insist on cancellation, he can always recover a corresponding portion of his purchase price and of the costs of making the contract, notwithstanding that the thing may have diminished in value, and damages in addition if it has become more valuable.

In the case of a right of usufruct, or of a right of lease extending over the whole of the property sold the length of which is for more than one year for buildings and two years for lands, the purchaser can, in conformity with Art. 701, have the sale cancelled without having to prove the insufficiency of the rights which remain.

The purchaser cannot claim damages from an attaching creditor, unless the latter was aware at the time of attachment that the thing did not belong to the debtor, nor can he do so from the debtor unless the latter has fraudulently denied or concealed the rights of third persons to the thing.

Public officials entrusted with the keeping of the fee registers and with adjudication proceedings are not liable for damages, unless by grave negligence in the discharge of their duties they have contributed to the mistake of a purchaser.

He is not guarantor of the debtor's solvency, unless he has expressly given such guaranty.

Even in this case, he is, in the case of a claim already due, and unless there be a formal engagement of a more extensive nature, only answerable for the debtor's actual solvency, that is for his solvency at the date of assignment, and only to the extent of the price he has received ; without prejudice, however, to the special rules governing commercial securities negotiable by endorsement.

Where in the case of a claim that has not yet fallen due, the assignor has guaranteed without other specification “the future solvency of the debtor,” the guaranty ceases to apply, where the insolvency of the debtor whose debt has been assigned takes place later than one year after the due date of the debt, and in the case of an annuity in perpetuity after ten years from the assignment.

A right, for the purposes of the above disposition, is to be deemed as in litigation, where it is already the subject of a formal dispute, judicial or extra-judicial, concerning its very existence.

Where under this article a guaranty is incurred, the assignor, in addition to restitution of the price of assignment and costs, is bound to compensate for the advantages which the assignee reasonably expected.

He is not guarantor of any specific advantage unless he has so stated.

Where the vendor has already paid all or part of such debts or incurred expense in preserving the estate, or where he has himself rights of claim against the succession, the assignee must credit him therewith.

On the other hand, the vendor must credit the assignee with what he himself owes to the succession, with what he has received in respect of inherited rights of claim, and with any other benefits he has derived from the succession.

The same applies in every case in which the sale has been made “at the risk and peril of the purchaser.”

In no case, however, and by virtue of no stipulation can the vendor escape from a guaranty against disturbance or eviction, resulting from rights conferred by him cither prior or subsequent to sale.

Where the vendor has obtained from the Court a time of grace for delivery, the purchaser has the same further time for payment of the price.

Similarly, a time of grace granted for payment of the price extends also to delivery.

Where payment is due either before or after delivery, it is to be made at the domicile of the purchaser.

Nevertheless, in the case of coinmodities or other objects liable to rapid de terioration, the vendor, if it be possible, must resell the same for account of the purchaser.

Where cancellation has been expressly stipulated between the parties, the Court cannot retard it by according a time of grace ; it does not, however, take effect, as of course, until the party who is in default has been ineffectually constituted in arrear.

Nevertheless, the vendor can always protect his right of cancellation as against third parties by subsequently making public, in manner mentioned in Art. 372, such charges and conditions or his application for cancellation.

Where the sale has been nude without a term for payment, the vendor can have the sale cancelled at any time within eight days after delivery; without prejudice, however, to real rights already acquired by third persons acting in good faith.

Such time cannot exceed five years for immovables and two years for movables.

Where the stipulation is made for a longer time, it is, as of course, reduced to such period.

Such time once fixed cannot be prolonged even within the respective limits of two and five years.

Nevertheless, prolongation may be considered as a promise by the purchaser to resell ; in such case, it is governed by the provisions of Arts. 663 and 664.

The same applies to a stipulation for repurchase made subsequently to sale or by a separate document.

In the case of movables, the option of repurchase cannot be exercised against third parties who have acquired in good faith real rights over the thing sold.

Nevertheless, the purchaser can insist upon their first establishing the insolvency of their debtor and upon their getting themselves judicially subrogated to the vendor, in conformity with Art. 359, for the purpose of exercising such option.

The purchaser can, however, put a stop to the action taken by the creditors by paying them off to the extent of their intercst, after deducting therefrom such amounts as the vendor would have to pay back to him.

Where the vendor has alienated the ownership of the thing subject to redemption, its acquirer can exercise the right of repurchase in his own name, provided he respects other real rights previously agreed to by the vendor and disclosed by transcription, and without prejudice to his right of recourse on ground of guaranty.

Where the purchaser refuses to receive the said sums of money, they should forthwith be placed on deposit.

The vendor has also to reimburse all expenses incurred which have improved the thing; but he may, for so doing, obtain time from the Court.

The purchaser enjoys the right to detain the thing until payment in full of the said amounts.

The purchaser on his side cannot object to redemption of the whole.

If such partition sale has taken place on application of the purchaser, the vendor is entitled to exercise his right of redemption in respect only of the part he sold.

The purchaser also in such case is entitled to oppose redemption of the whole.

Where the vendor has not been summoned to the partition, he can at his option either ratify what has been done and exercise against his purchaser the above mentioned right, or reimburse the latter the price he has received from him and invoke against his co-owners a fresh partition.

He can also object to redemption of the whole by one only of the vendors, unless such vendor is acting under authority of the others.

The same applies where a sole vendor has died leaving several heirs.

Where, on the other hand, the different co-owners have sold their shaves by separate contracts, each, if the case admits, can exercise his right of repurchase separately, but subject to the application of Arts. 728 and 730.

Where partition has already taken place, the vendor cannot exercise his right of redemption against each, except for the share which has been allotted to him under the partition or under partition sale.

The same rules apply, where a single purchaser has died leaving several heirs.

Where option of repurchase has been stipulated for, both periods of time run concurrently during the continuance of the shorter.

Each party has always the right to apply to the Court for leave to nominate an expert. In every case the Court must of its own motion appoint one.

In other respects, the general rules laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for reports of experts are to be applied.

If he prefers to return the thing, he recovers the price paid with interest from the time of demand being made, and he has to make restitution of all fruits collected by him alter such date.

In this latter case, he is entitled to retain possession until reimbursement in full of the price and interest.

In such case he recovers the price he paid and the costs of the contract; the interest of his purchase money, however, up to the date of demand is set off against his enjoyment or use of the thing.

Six months for immovables ;

Three months for movables other than animals ;

One month for these latter.

The time commences to run from delivery.

Nevertheless, such time is to be reduced by one half, from the date on which it is proved that the purchaser became aware of the defects.

The action can. however, be entertained after the expiry of the time prescribed, where the purchaser proves that, owing to inevitable accident or irresistible force, the bidden defect has not been able to manifest itself within such time.

Whatever may lie the extent of the partial loss, the right of action for reduction of the price, in proportion to what is left of the thing, remains.

In every case the vendor remains liable for total or partial loss arising from the hidden defect itself.

Each of the co-sellers has always the right to insist on the admission of strangers to the bidding, and this takes place, as of course, when any of them are absent or without legal capacity.

Where adjudication after public sale, or where private sale, is made to a third person, the same produces between him and the former co-owners respectively the consequences of sale, as laid down in this Chapter.

It can also be created gratuitously by donation or by will.

In this latter case, it is subject to the special rules governing gratuitous acts, with respect to the form of the gratuity, the legal capacity to give and receive, and the extent of the property that may be disposed of.

In such case, it must as between promisee and promisor follow the rules of onerous contracts, and as between promisee and beneficiary those of donations; it is not, however, subject to the requisite formalities of donations.

A life annuity can also be reserved over property that is alienated either onerously or gratuitously.

In this latter case, the consent of the third party is necessary in order to form the contract, where the same is onerous; but payments made before such consent is given cannot be recovered.

In such cases the disposition of Art. 103 in the matter of usufruct is to be applied.

It is cancelled as of course, if such person dies within a period of sixty days of a disease from which he was then already suffering.

Such condition cannot be set up against third persons, unless it is contained in the instrument itself that creates the annuityWhere a life annuity has been established gratuitously by way of a pension for maintenance, it is, as of course, non-assignable, and not liable to attachment, although the instrument of donation or the will may not have so stated.

The dispositions of this article do not apply to a life annuity reserved in favor of the donor over the property donated.

They never apply to payments that have fallen due.

Nevertheless, if they are payable in advance, the payment for a period begun is due in full.

The same course is to be followed where the annuity has been created gratuitously or reserved over property donated or left by will.

A life certificate is to be delivered by the administrative official of the locality, or by a notary practising in the district, where such person is for the time being residing.

The same right belongs to the person entitled to a life annuity reserved over property donated or left by will.

Cancellation is not decreed if the person on whose life the annuity depends happens to die before final judgment.

A life annuity can also be extinguished by redemption where agreed on, by novation, by conventional release, by confusion, or by prescription.

A life annuity is, however, not subject to prescription, where it is by virtue of law or of the will of man, in conformity with Arts. 819 and 820, non-assignable or not liable to attachment.

In every case the periodical payments become separately prescribed by a lapse of five years from the time they fall due.

In the case, however, of an annuity that has been created onerously, or has been charged on a donation or legacy, and of the death of the person on whose life the annuity depends by some unlawful means attributable to the debtor, the contract or gratuity is to be cancelled and the debtor is to return whatever he may have acquired, without recovering any of the periodical payments made. Where, in the case just mentioned of the death of the person on whose life the annuity depends through the fault of the debtor, the annuity had been directly donated or left by will, the making of the periodical payments is to be continued in favor of the persons interested for such time as the Court may fix as being the probable time for which the life of such person would have lasted.

Insurance called “life,” that is against death, is also to be treated as an inland insurance irrespective of what may be the anticipated cause of death or the time of its occurrence.

Insurance against personal accidents in the exercise of dangerous trades or callings is governed by special laws and by the general principles of this Section.

Nevertheless, in case of alienation of the thing insured, the rights of the insured, corresponding to the premiums or joint subscriptions already paid, pass to the acquirer, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary ; but the insurance ceases to run for the future, unless the insured has made such acquirer take his place and stead without prejudice to the interests of the insurer or to his right to damages.

An insurance can also be made by a person voluntarily managing the affairs of another, where he contracts in the name and for account of the person interested.

If, however, the usufructuary has insured buildings without specifying whether he has done so on his own account or on account of the bare owner, he is to be presumed to have done so in order to in the first place protect himself as against the latter from his liability in case of fire, as established in Art. 88.

It docs not extend to the right of recourse of neighbours to whom he has communicated a fire or to any loss he sustains through cessation of the lease in consequence of fire, unless he has so stipulated in the insurance; in default of any such stipulation the insurance benefits the landlord.

It is the same in the case of an insurance made by a mortgage creditor, whatever may be his rank as such, or even by an unsecured creditor; without prejudice, however, to deduction being in the first place made of premiums or subscriptions in favour of the person who has taken out the insurance.

In the contrary case, it benefits the person who has the opposite right, save reimbursement as mentioned in the preceding article of premiums or subscriptions.

Where the thing had only partially perished, the insurance is still void if such fact was unknown to both the parties or to one of them.

An insurance is likewise void, where it has for subject-matter future gains other than natural or civil fruits of property of the insured.

Where a thing has not originally been insured for its full actual value, it can subsequently be insured for the balance either with the same insurer or with another.

Nullity of the second insurance is, however, saved, if the first is annulled in consequence of the following article or on any other grounds.

Where such insurances have been taken out on the same day, without such information having been respectively duly given, they are in like manner void without any right to recover what has been paid.

Where information has been duly given, the first insurer can, at his choice, continue his insurance or cancel it for the future, returning in this latter case the half of the premiums or subscriptions received in respect of the time still to run.

If such different insurances are of equal date, the insurers are liable for the indemnity in proportion to the sum for which each has insured.

In this case, the conditions of, the two insurances are independent of each other; nevertheless, the indemnity stipulated to be paid by the second insurer cannot be greater than that which the first has himself promised to pay.

The insurance, notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary, does not cover spontaneous combustion of hay or crops prematurely stored or ricked.

Any silence or inaccuracy in this respect, whether committed by mistake or in bad faith, and which the insurer has dis-covered before the happening of the disaster, gives rise, according to the circumstances and the gravity of the case, either to nullity of the insurance without return of premiums already paid or due, or the raising of the amount of such premiums for the past as well as for the future.

Where the inaccuracy has not been discovered until after the disaster, and the risks of loss that were unknown may have had an influence on the same, the insurer is either wholly or partially released from payment of the indemnity.

If such risks have had nothing to do with the disaster, the indemnity is to be reduced by the increased premium which the insured should have paid.

In the case of movable objects insured against fire, their removal without permission from the premises where they were at the time of insurance for any other reason than that of salvage deprives the insured from all right to indemnity in case of accident.

The proof that changes have been made in the conditions of the risk rests with the insurer.

Where premiuns have to be so demanded, the insured cannot forfeit his right for default of payment until after he has been duly constituted in arrear.

Where, however, the premium has to be paid as above mentioned, the insured in default of payment at due date forfeits, as of course, the benefit of the insurance, unless there be a condition to the contrary in the policy.

In both cases, the insured is no longer liable to forfeiture if the insurer has received the premium, although paid late, and if meanwhile no accident has happened.

Where the premium has to be demanded, the insured may always make payment thereof at the domicile of the insurer before it falls due, and even after wards so long as forfeiture has not been incurred.

In the case of mutual insurances forfeiture is governed by the articles of association, and, in default of their providing therefor, by the general law governing money obligations.

Such information can always be given in the first place to the local authorities, and must be given to it first if the policy so requires.

If they have decreased in value, the insurer is only liable for their value at the time of the happening of the disaster.

Proof of decrease in value rests with the insurer.

Where the insured is as to a part his own insurer, as mentioned in Art. 843, he has to bear a like share of the risk.

In the case, however, of an insurance by the tenant of a house to protect himself against the right of recourse of the owner or neighbours, the insured only bears the risk thereof in so far as the same may exceed the amount of the promised indemnity.

In the case of buildings, the insurer may always deduct the value of any building which remains intact; in respect of those which have been only damage 1 by fire, the insurer has the option of cither repairing them at his cost, or of (raying their value and taking away the materials.

In either case, the costs of salvage of the above mentioned objects have to be borne by the insurer.

It docs not either cover manuscripts and other objects which have no appreciable marketable value.

An insurance made for the benefit of a person who is not an heir of the insured, and who does not furnish him any equivalent value, is, except in so far as regards form, to be treated as a donation on the part of the deceased.

In either case, such stipulation is void if the beneficiary has not an appreciable pecuniary interest in the life of the person insured, and if such person was not a party to the contract or has not separately in writing given his consent thereto.

A beneficiary other than the insured car only assign his right to the indemnity with the consent of the insured, and upon it being proved that the assignee has an appreciable interest in the insured's life.

In the absence of such information, and although there may have been no fraud, the insurer, according to the gravity of the case, and in conformity with Art. 857. can demand either annulment of the insurance, or an increase in the premium, or a reduction in the indemnity.

Cancellation takes place, as of course, where, such extra premium not having been paid, the insured dies from the direct consequences of such military or naval service or travelling.

For the purposes of applying this article long voyages arc to be considered as voyages by sea other than those from port to port in Japan.

Where, however, the premium has already been paid once or oftener, the insurer must pay an indemnity proportionate to such payments.

Where death results from a capital sentence, the insurer must pay to those claiming under the assured an indemnity proportionate to the premiums paid.

Where, however, the insured has in the cases mentioned in Arts. 844 and 845 forfeited the benefits of the contract, an indemnity proportionate to the premiums already received is to be paid.