Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change

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Abstract

Does changing the form of government actually change who are in power? Despite its significance for regime change and state building, the impact of regime change on the elite group has not received adequate scholarly attention. The new data on 2,980 government elites since the Meiji Restoration Japan (1868) revealed the three results: (i) the proportion of elites whose fathers were elites in the former regime is low in the regime transition phase but increases in the regime consolidation phase, (ii) the proportion of elites whose fathers were commoners increases throughout the regime change process, and (iii) the internal hierarchy of political elites begins to more intensively reflect the social stratum of the former regime and discount the people's own talents as the new regime consolidates. Regime change increases social mobility in the elite society but it does not last long.

INTRODUCTION

To what extent are revolutions truly revolutionary? Does changing the form of government actually change who is in power? Mobility of elites in a society under a regime change has long been investigated by social scientists. There are two classic views pertaining to this issue. One of them is Pareto's elite circulation theory (1916), which argues that elites in one regime are replaced by other elites when regimes change. The other is Schumpeter's elite reproduction theory (1919) that emphasizes path dependency and casts doubts on social mobility. These views have inspired a century of works that broadly consider mobility during regime change. However, the presence or absence of social mobility during regime change continues to remain a matter of dispute. For example, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Moore (1966) insist that regime change influences elite mobility while Clark (2014), Gerber (2000), Hankiss (1990), and Szelényi and Szelényi (1995) argue that there is no such influence. However, is the effect of a regime change really linear? A regime change certainly changes the elite society at least in the short term and perhaps in the long term. Meanwhile, whether a critical juncture is a revolution, a palace coup, a military coup, or other type of regime change, there is more or less a resilience to past structures of elite stratification that transcends a critical juncture in the post-critical juncture phase. The aim of our

paper is not to support either side of the social mobility discussion but to analyze this more complicated elite circulation and reproduction dynamics under a regime change.

This paper explores the mobility of political elites under a regime change, exploiting the data from Meiji Restoration, Japan in 1868. By this event, the regime of the *Tokugawa Shogunate*, which had ruled Japan for more than 260 years, had been taken over by the regime of the Meiji government, and Japan started to transit to a modern state from a feudal and authoritarian state with a rigid class system. We constructed a database of 2,980 government elites as of 1915, from Who's Who (*Jinji Koshinroku*) data. An advantage of this source is that it provides detailed information about each political elite, including occupation, title, awards, birth year, birth place, educational background, father's name, father's hometown, father's social strata in the feudal regime, etc. The information on the father's social strata is particularly valuable in the context of this paper, because we can observe the change in the social and political position of each elite's family over the Meiji Restoration.

Using the data, we examine the influence of father's social stratum on the position of a political elite in the Meiji regime. In the analyses, we divide the samples into two subsamples, that is, the elites who were born before 1868 and those who were born after that. We can compare the

change in the influence of father's social strata over time, or more specifically over the phases of the regime change. The elites who were born before 1868 became adults before the end of the 1880s, when the fundamental structure of the Meiji state, including the Constitution (1889) and the Imperial Diet (1890), was established. However, the elites who were born after 1868 became adults after the fundamental structure of Meiji state was established. We assume that the positions of the former group reflected the situation in the phase where the new regime was being established (the regime transition phase)[1] and that the positions of the latter group reflected the situation in the phase where the new regime had already been established (the regime consolidation phase).[2] By comparing the influence of the fathers' social strata on the positions of elites between the regime transition phase and its consolidation phase, we found that the influence of fathers' social

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[1] The transition is defined as "the interval between one political regime and another (O'Donnell and Schumitter 1986, p.6)." They later argue that "since in transitions there are not established rules to the political game, the impact of the whole set of structural variables diminishes at those times of generalized uncertainty." (Munck and Snyder 2007, p.292)

[2] Extending the definition of Linz and Stepan (1996, p.4), we argue that a regime consolidates when no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the regime or secede from the state.

strata on the elites' positions increased in the regime consolidation phase. The proportion of elites whose fathers were elites in the former regime was thus low in the regime transition phase, but increased in the regime consolidation phase.

This paper contributes to the literature on social mobility and the literature on regime change. Political regime changes provide opportunities for social mobility in general, but the extent of increase in social mobility differs across regime changes. Indeed, in the cases of radical regime changes such as the post-war Chinese Civil War, the American War of Independence, and the French Revolution, almost all the old elites were killed or banished by the challenger. However, not only in the Meiji Restoration but even in the Russian Revolution, one of the most radical regime changes, the impact of the former regime on the new elite group remains although the influence is mitigated by new factors (e.g. Lankina, Libman, and Obydenkoya 2016; Silberman 1964). Our findings, taking this discussion one step further, suggest that the extent of increase in social mobility or continuity differ not only across regime changes, but that it also differs across the phases within a regime change.

With regard to the regime change, Samuel Huntington argues in his book, *The Third Wave*, that "(N)egotiations and compromise among political elites were at the heart of the

democratization process (Huntington 1991, 165)." The importance of power sharing with the elites

of the former regime at a regime change is widely agreed upon by studies on democratization (e.g.

Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992; Higley and Burton 1989; Higley and Moore 1981; Huntington

1984, 1991; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Levine 1978; Linz 1978; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986;

Peeler 1985; Przeworski 1986; Rustow 1970; Sartori 1987; Wilde 1978). Even the literature on

establishment of authoritarian regime argues that a new dictator not only uses punishment and

other deterrent means to keep the vanquished in line, but also attempts to diminish the fear of

exclusion among people in order to establish loyalty, solicit cooperation, and/or deter threat of

another revolution (e.g. Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Bueno

de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Svolik 2009; Wright 2008).

In this respect, Tilly (1978) noted that optimal power sharing depends upon the phases of

regime change.

It is the formation of coalitions between members of the polity and the contenders

advancing exclusive alternative claims to control over the government. The relationship is

actually curvilinear: If no such coalition exists, that diminishes the chance that the

revolutionary coalition will win—that there will be any transfer of power at all. However,

if the coalitions are extensive, the revolutionary settlement will tend to restore the previous status quo. The wise revolutionary who wishes to produce a large transfer of power forms the minimum necessary coalition with existing members of the policy, and forces his coalition partners to break irrevocably with other members of the polity (Tilly 1978, 213).

According to Tilly's argument, the contenders are not expected to allow many incumbent elites to join their group in the regime transition phase, in order to achieve the regime change successfully. The compromise with the existing or original government elites would hinder the success of overthrowing the incumbent regime. Instead, the contenders attempt to weaken their power by excluding the incumbent elites from politics and expropriating their lands, goods, and servants. Examining the regime change by a new dictator, Albertus and Menaldo (2012) also argue that the new dictator expropriates to survive the uncertainty that besets him or her upon taking power, and large-scale expropriation early in the process of the regime change helps dictators maintain their power. Those argument suggests that the contender may compromise with the former elites after a regime change is accomplished and a new regime is established.

The influence of fathers' social strata in the feudal society and its overtime change that we found for Japan's Meiji Restoration, indicates how the power sharing was done, and how the manner of power sharing changed over the phases of the regime change. To contend against the incumbent elites and establish the new regime, the contenders must gather allies and staff members because they are a minority within the current political order. Therefore, in this phase, even activists from the non-elite social classes have an opportunity to join the government elite group and be assigned to higher-level positions based on their abilities. Consequently, during the regime transition phase, the number and proportion of political elites from the incumbent elite group joining the new elites is low, and the intra-elite hierarchy is determined regardless of their social status.

The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we overview the case of the Meiji Restoration. Second, we explain the dataset of political elites. Third, using the dataset, we analyze the change in the elite membership and the intra-elite hierarchy over phases, focusing on fathers' social strata in the feudal society on the position of elites. The final section concludes with a discussion of the implications of our analyses for the study of mobility and continuity during a regime change.

Meiji Restoration Japan, 1868

In 1868, a drastic political regime change, referred to as the Meiji Restoration or the Meiji Revolution, that occurred in Japan shifted the power from the Tokugawa *Shogunate* to the Meiji government under the authority of the Emperor who achieved rapid modernization and laggardly ushered in partial democracy by the end of the century. The Meiji Restoration, therefore, marked Japan's revolution from a feudal and authoritarian state with a rigid social class system to a modern industrial nation-state with more liberty, albeit without the uprising from frustrated peasants and bourgeois in the English revolution and the French revolution (e.g., Banno 2012; Beasley 1972; Gluck 1985; Gordon 2003; Hoston 1991; Jansen 2002; Lockwood 1954; Mitani 2013; Moore 1966; Moulder 1977; Scalapino 1953; Trimberger 1978). Let us trace the history of the Meiji Restoration briefly.[3]

The Tokugawa *Shogunate* ruled Japan from the early 15th century and enjoyed considerable prestige for two centuries. However, Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States

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[3] For more information on the Meiji Restoration, see Banno (2012), Gordon (2003), Jansen (1989. 2002), and Mitani (2013).

arrived in Japan in 1853 and demanded that Japan be opened to trade. Although Japan had been sealed off to the outside world for two centuries, the Tokugawa *Shogunate* agreed to his demand due to American military pressure and also signed treaties with the European powers. This forced opening of the treaty ports had an immediate impact on both economy and politics. The beginning of the trade caused sharp inflation, because the difference of gold-to-silver exchange rates of Japan with international rate led to the massive drain of gold to foreign countries, and to prevent the drain of gold, the *Shogunate* issued new gold oval coins with a much lower weight standard. Consumers and producers were thus angered by the decision of the Tokugawa government. Cholera spread, and people attributed it to the opening of the ports. Additionally, the treaties demonstrating the Tokugawa government's inability to protect the country resulted in lowering the reputation of the government. At that time, the *Shogun* and other *samurai* who ruled Japan enjoyed political privileges because of their status as warriors. However, the forced treaties with the U.S. and European countries destroyed the authority of the Tokugawa *Shogun* for ruling the country. In this situation, feudal lords (*Daimyo*) of the outer domains that had been eliminated from the Tokugawa politics – *Satsuma*, *Choshu*, *Tosa*, and *Hizen* – and the middle- and lower-ranked *samurai*, many of who were from the above four domains became the core members of the rebels. In the process

of overthrowing the Tokugawa regime, Japan had two small-scale and one-large scale civil wars.

The first two wars were between the Tokugawa government and *Choshu* in 1861 and 1866. After

these civil wars, the rebels finally gained permission to overthrow the Tokugawa government from

the Emperor, who despite not having substantial power after the 14th century, continued to retain

the symbolic status as Japan's top leader. They began a civil war with the Tokugawa *Shogunate* in

1868 that ended in 1869. Approximately 0.8-1.2 million people were mobilized in this civil war,

and 14,000 people died.

The first task for the contenders was to terminate the former regime. Therefore, the

challengers removed all traces of the Tokugawa *Shogun* from the castle in 1868, confiscated the

lands and servants of the feudal lords (*Daimyo*) by 1872, and deprived the privileges of the *samurai*

such as the right to carry weapons in public and their salaries until mid-1870s. The new Meiji

government proceeded with a series of these reforms peacefully, pledging to pay salary to feudal

lords for their whole lifetime and a lump-sum salary to other *samurai*. Some disaffected *samurai*

rose in revolt against the Meiji government until 1877 but the government successfully quelled all

revolts.

The Meiji government also quickly granted liberty to the masses. The government newly allowed non-elite people to have a family name in 1870, and granted people the freedom to establish residence in any location they wanted, choose any occupation, and get married to anyone regardless of their social strata in 1871. The government also announced compulsory education for eight years in 1872. Nevertheless, most core members of the Meiji government were negative about establishing the legislature and enfranchising the people. Additionally, the newly established bureaucracy consisted of staff selected based on informal criteria or connections with core government members. Therefore, at first, people had no formal access to become involved in politics or become government elites. Rather, they had to bear the heavy land taxes that the Meiji government newly established to address the huge costs such as the war costs for the civil war and the rebellions, the costs for industrialization, and the costs for paying salary to the former feudal lords. Farmers who became frustrated with the heavy tax burden revolted repeatedly against the new government, but the Meiji government suppressed them and only slightly decreased the tax rate.

The failures of *samurai* revolts and peasant riots in the 1870s indicated that the Meiji government achieved to gain military supremacy. As a result, people started the freedom and

people's right movement to voice their feelings within the existing political framework instead of subverting it, by demanding the opening of the parliament and enfranchisement, and the Meiji government started to establish institutions and systems for consolidating the new regime. To address the people's frustration, the Meiji government promised to open a parliament and grant the franchise to the large taxpayers in 1881 and fulfilled the promises in 1890. In addition, the government formulated the Examination of High Civil Servants rule for bureaucrats in 1887. This rule made everyone who had obtained a bachelor of law or arts from the University of Tokyo, which was the first imperial university after the Meiji Restoration, eligible as a bureaucracy candidate without taking the entrance exam. Moreover, the Army War College was founded in 1882, and the Naval War College was established in 1888. These institutions gave everyone access to the government elite group regardless of birth. Meanwhile, the Meiji government also institutionalized the new nobility system in 1884, the Privy Council in 1888, and the House of Peers in 1890, in order to garner the support of the former elites and ensure the privileges of both old and new elites. By the early 1890s, the government had thus succeeded in establishing the main governing institutions.

Many scholars have examined the influence of the Meiji Restoration on social mobility, including that of elites, but they conclude that new factors such as education strengthen the influence on social mobility while the former regime maintains the influence (Bellah 1957; Donnithorne and Allen 1954; Fujita 1948; Harootunian 1959; Man'nari 1965; Moore 1966; Nakamura 1999; Silberman 1964; Skocpol 1979; Sonoda 1990; Sugano 1931; Takane 1976, 1981; Tominaga 1990; Tsuchiya 1954). They consider the changes to have occurred in one direction and do not examine the possibility of non-linear change. On the other hand, the theoretical study by Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995) argues that the Meiji Constitution and other institutions were the outcomes of bargaining and compromises between relevant entities at each moment. This study suggests that elite compositions are also bargaining for their desired outcomes at each moment, and therefore, the change in the new elite group might not be in one direction.

The Meiji Restoration is particularly advantageous for exploring elite membership and its internal hierarchy over phases of regime change. First, the post-Meiji Restoration government created a new internal hierarchy for government elites named *Kyuchu-Sekiji* – literally means "order of precedence in the emperor's court" – that categorized the elites into 70 ranks. Therefore, we can precisely specify government elites in the new regime and their ranks in the new hierarchy.

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Second, we were able to collect detailed biographical information about the 2,980 political elites in the new regime from *Jinji-Koshin-Roku* (Who's Who Record) volume 4 published in 1915 (Jinji Koshin-Jo 1915).[4] Obtaining text data using OCR technology, we could construct a database of all the persons listed in the record, which included detailed biographical information—not only about their own careers, education background, and ranks in the new elite hierarchy but also their fathers' home towns and social classes in the former regime—and we were able to measure intergenerational social mobility, comparing the relative statuses of fathers and sons.[5]

One important previous study uses *Jinji-Koshin-Roku*. Takane (1976, 1981) examines elite mobility from 1869 to 1969, and reveals the factors that influence elite membership and intra-elite hierarchy. However, his focus is not on the difference between the regime transition phase and its consolidation phase, and hence, his strategy and conclusion are different from ours. One difference is that he did not collect the data in the transition phase. In addition, since he analyzes the elites' own feudal status in the new regime and not the status of their fathers in the former regime, the

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[4] *Jinji-Koshin-Roku* is known as a provider of the most credible who's who record during the period, and scholars are in consensus about the relative reliability of their provided information (e.g. Aso 1978; Iwami et al. 1981; Takane 1976, 1981).

[5] We collected the information of the elites' biological fathers and not foster fathers.

analyzed social status includes the posteriori ones acquired by elites' career success or adoption.

Therefore, his conclusion is that feudal status maintained a strong influence from 1860 to 1936 and faded only after World War II (Takane 1981, 151). He does not demonstrate that empirical weakening of the former elites occurred in the regime transition phase.[6] The following analyses, therefore, have added a new perspective to the literature of modern Japanese history.

Data

To specify the government elites and their ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy, we use the order of precedence in the emperor's court (*Kyuchu-Sekiji*) established by the Imperial House Law Act (*Koshitsu-Rei*) Number 1 in 1915. The ranks of *Kyuchu-Sekiji* consisted of current and former posts, titles—the Royal and Noble Ranks (*Shakui*)— and awards that divided government elites

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[6] The studies by Takane (1976, 1981) have the following technical limitations: firstly, his dataset does not include military awards, owing to which he fails to capture information about many military men, although they played a substantial role in the new regime. Secondly, the size of his dataset is much smaller than ours, since he obtains the data by sampling and not by using the complete dataset of *Jinji-Koshin-Roku*. Thirdly, he records elites' ranks inaccurately. He assumes that the more number of high awards a person had, the higher was his/her position, which contradicts the contents of Article 2 of the Imperial House Act No. 1, as we explain later.

into 70 ranks (See Appendix). Each title and award had been institutionalized before 1915 but this order arranged all ranks derived from them in the same line. The Royal and Noble Rank system was institutionalized in 1884 and these titles, divided into four ranks, were given to the old elites such as the Tokugawa *Shogun* and feudal lords (Daimyo), and the new elites who had rendered distinguished services to the Meiji government. These titles could be inherited by their descendants. Awards were divided into (1) *Kunto* (Order of Merit), (2) *Ika*i (Court Rank),[7] (3) *Kokyu* (Merit Grade) particularly for military, and (4) *Jako-no-Mashiko* and *Kinkei-no-Mashiko* (honorary posts entitled to enter into the special rooms in the Emperor's Palace). An individual such as a bureaucrat or a military man would be assigned an award corresponding to his or her position, whenever he or she reached a higher post. Currently, the imperial ranks are only given to elder people but at that time, the awards were given immediately in principle.[8] These awards were principally

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[7] *Ika*i (Court Rank) was the most popular award (Fujii 1990) and offered to nobilities, government officers, military men, imperial university professors, national school headmasters, and those that were given credit for Japan.

[8] For example, the chief judge of a district court was normally awarded the Fourth Order and the Fifth Rank. An army general was normally awarded the First Order and the Second Class, and some of them were awarded as the Grand Cordon of the Order and the First Class. Vice-ministers, the top position of civilian bureaucrats, were at least awarded the Third Order. The ambassadors

guaranteed for a lifetime but could not be inherited by the descendants of the receiver. Therefore, these awards were indicative of the highest position that each elite has held in the new government.

We excluded the ranks derived from the current and former posts and selected only the ranks derived from awards and titles for the analyses. The reason is that awards and titles were principally guaranteed for a lifetime while current and former positions were unstable as well as could have been attained through elections that contradicted the emperor's will.[9]

The analytical focus was on the new governments' strategies for elite recruitment, and *Kyuchu-Sekiji* is therefore ideal because it was determined by the Emperor; reflected the Emperor's intentions;[10] and included a variety of elites, such as bureaucrats, military leaders, businessmen,

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at the big countries such as the UK, the US, Italy, Russia, and France were awarded the First Order.

[9] In 1915, 90 percent of the members of the House of Peers had received while a half of the members of the House of Representatives did not have any awards according to our database.

[10] Strictly speaking, we should distinguish emperors from governments; however, emperors were symbolic figures for the challengers that overthrew the former regimes, established new regimes, and consolidated them. Therefore, we use *Kyuchu-Sekiji* to indicate government elites. Additionally, Nishikawa (1996, 2002) argues that military personnel were more likely than civilians to obtain high-ranking posts. This ranking system could be considered a biased system, but what is notable is that the Emperor intentionally biased his appointments. This is meaningful

scholars, scientists, and cultural celebrities. Therefore, we assume that government elites were those who had been given titles or awards and create the dependent variable, $rank_i \in [1, 70]$,[11] which records the highest rank each elite had.[12]

To compare the statuses of sons to their fathers, we identify the father's social stratum of each government elite in the former regime, f_class_i. We divided the social strata in the former regime into four scales [1,4]: (a) higher-ranked elites (nobilities and feudal lord) recorded as four,[13]

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because we can interpret it as a sign that emperors and the core members of the Meiji government valued support from the military more than they valued it from civilians.

[11] In the Imperial House Law, a low-numbered rank meant a high rank, but we refined the number from the higher to the lower for avoiding confusion. This means that $rank_i$ is recorded as 71 minus the original rank.

[12] We follow Article 2 of the Imperial House Act No. 1, which determined that a person should take the highest-ranked seat if more than one rank was available.

[13] The category of nobilities and feudal lords includes *Shogun* who was the military dictator of Japan in the former regime, Imperial families, feudal lords (*Daimyo*), and nobilities who dominated the Japanese imperial court (*Kuge*).

(b) middle-ranked elites (higher-ranked *samurai*) recorded as three,[14] (c) lower-ranked elites (*samurai*) recorded as two,[15] and (d) non-elites (commoner) recorded as one.

To examine the difference between the regime transition phase and its consolidation phase, dividing government elites into the pre-Meiji-Restoration-born group and the post-Meiji-Restoration-born group, we created a dummy variable *phase$_i$*, which takes value one, if an elite was born after 1867 and zero otherwise. The reason we differentiate the regime transition phase from its consolidation phase was that the government could not establish most nationwide institutions until the early 1890 as we have mentioned in Section 3.1. We considered 1890 to be the pivotal year because not only did these institutions consolidate the new regime but they also opened avenues for everyone to join the elite group. Before 1890s, people had to find a way to join

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[14] The category of higher-ranked *samurai* includes the upper vassals of the Tokugawa house (*Hatamoto*), feudal lords' relatives (*Hanshu-Ichimon*), and advisors of feudal lords (*Karō*).

[15] The category of *samurai* also includes *Shizoku*. More than half of the *samurai* in the Tokugawa *Shogunate* became re-categorized as *Shizoku* after the Meiji Restoration by an administrative order issued in 1869 (Yamaguchi 2000). The rest of the *samurai* were the people who chose to become commoners or were rejected because of their very low status in the *samurai* group. Therefore, we assume that most *Shizoku* were *samurai* in the former regime since it was nearly impossible that commoners in the former regime became *Shizoku* after the Meiji Restoration.

the elite group by themselves. However, these institutions allowed all people, regardless of birth, to become bureaucrats as long as they passed the entrance exam or graduate from the University of Tokyo, to become military elites if they graduated from military schools and colleges with a good degree, or to become politicians if they won an election. At that time, the standard age for earning a bachelor's degree was 22 for medical students and 21 for others (*Monbu-sho* ed. 1981). Therefore, we assume that the people who started their career in the regime consolidation phase were born after 1867.

In addition, we created the following control variables. Concerning the educational background, an important variable is overseas study experience. Tokugawa *Shogunate* had a foreign policy that restricted the entry of foreigners and forbade the Japanese from leaving and reentering Japan until 1866. Therefore, the people who had Western knowledge were rare and in demand for achieving modernization (Ishizuki 1972; Silberman 1964; Tsuji 2010; Watanabe 1977). We argue that the people who experienced study abroad were more likely to be promoted (Silberman 1964) and examine its effects using a dummy variable, *edu_oversea$_i$*, which takes value one, if an elite had experience of studying abroad and zero otherwise. Additionally, domestic education might have influenced their success (Aso 1978; Amano 1990; Iwami et al. 1981;

Man'nari 1965; Takane 1976, 1981); hence, we create three more dummy variables to assess their

latest academic background. These were based on whether one was a PhD holder (edu_phd_i),

whether one had a BA and/or a Masters but not a PhD (edu_ba_i), and whether one had graduated

from a high school or higher-level school but not imperial universities ($edu\_highschool_i$).[16]

Additionally, we add the variable representing the father's hometown to see if the people

from the four domains that initiated the Meiji Restoration had privileges. These four domains are

Satsuma, *Choshu*, *Tosa*, and *Hizen*,[17] and the people from these domains were generally believed

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[16] During the time, only the imperial universities established after the regime change were able to

offer students bachelor and PhD degrees, and other (higher) professional schools and private

universities in Japan could offer neither. We also counted the Bachelor and PhD degrees gained by

foreign countries. In addition, we counted the people who had graduated from the Naval War

College or Army War College in Japan as Bachelor holders. We assume that if the record does not

include any information regarding education background about a person, his or her educational

level was less than high-school. For reference, before the regime change, no educational system

could confer a degree although there were schools that taught Confucianism or Western knowledge.

[17] Japan abolished the previous domain system and instead introduced a new system of prefectures

in 1871. Kagoshima prefecture included most area of *Satsuma* domain, Yamaguchi prefecture

included most of *Choshu* domain, Kochi prefecture included most of *Tosa* domain, and Saga

prefecture included most of *Hizen* domain. Therefore, we record both the elites whose fathers were

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to gain some privileges (e.g. Silberman 1964; Takane 1976, 1981). We, therefore, create a dummy variable, $f\_connection_i$, which takes a value of one if the father of an elite was from one of those four domains and zero otherwise. Lastly, we add a variable for each elite's birth date, $birthdate_i$,[18] to control for the effect of the Confucian sense of seniority.

We extracted the above information from the Who's Who Record (*Jinji-Koshin-Roku*) volume 4 published in 1915.[19] A total of 3,612 government elites, in the sense defined above, were included in this record, and for 2,981 of them, we were able to obtain information about their fathers' social classes in the former regime from the record. For 2,980 of them except one, the data of their birth dates were available as well. We can check the coverage of our data set by comparing it with the number of people who had titles and awards in the previous year, 1914, from the official government data provided by the Bureau of Statistics in the Cabinet Office (*Naikaku-Tokeikyoku*

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from the four domains and the ones whose fathers were from these four prefectures.

[18] We record birth year (yyyy), month (mm), and day (dd) as "*yyyy.mmdd.*"

[19] We chose this volume for three main reasons. First, it was in 1915 that the emperor established the order of precedence in the emperor's court (*Kyuchu-Sekiji*). Second, as 25 years had passed since 1890, those who became bureaucrats by passing the Examination of High Civil Servants became a vast majority by 1915. Third, the number of the people covered by the previous volumes of *Jinji-Koshin-Roku* is significantly lower.

1926). It is confirmed that 77 percent of the people who had titles in 1914 are included in our 2,980

observations. Regarding *Ika*i (Court Rank), 60 percent of the people who had Junior Fourth Rank

or higher are included.

Table 1 summarizes the distribution for dummy variables, and Table 2 summarizes

descriptive statistics for the other variables.[20]

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Membership and Internal Hierarchy of Elites

What kind of people joined the elite group and how did their membership change over phases of

regime change? Figure 1 shows the composition of the social stratum of the fathers of the pre-

Meiji-Restoration-born elites compared with those of the post-Meiji-Restoration-born elites in

order to analyze the change in the elite membership owing to the regime change.

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[20] Our dataset includes a very few young people. The minimum age of them were 4 years old.
These two boys were Yoshikane Yoshida and Hiromasa Arao, both of whom were sons of
aristocrats and inherited the title since their fathers died.

<Figure 1 should be here>

We find that the share of the elites whose fathers were lower-ranked elites (*samurai*) was more than 60 percent in the regime transition phase, while their share became reduced in its consolidation phase. This reflects that they led the Restoration, although they declined in influence during its consolidation phase.

On the other hand, in the regime consolidation period, their share declined substantially, while the sons of the higher-ranked elites of the old regime (feudal lords and nobilities) as well as the sons of the non-elites (commoners) increased. The results suggest that barriers preventing access to the elite group are steadily and continuously lowered in the process of regime change; on the contrary, the rebels against the Tokugawa regime or the new governments act differently toward elites during phases of regime change. They first contend against these elites in order to overthrow the incumbent regime while they reintegrate these elites into their new elite group after establishing the new regime in order to alleviate their dissatisfaction against the new regime and gain their support.

Let us move on the next question: how does social strata in the former regime influence the internal ranking of elites and how does the impact change over phases of regime change? We

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draw box plots of government elites by phases of the regime change over their fathers' social strata

(See Figure 2). We find that overall, the higher the social stratum of one's father in the former

regime, the higher one's own rank in the new regime. Moreover, both boxes and whiskers in the

regime transition phase were larger than those in its consolidation phase. This supports our

theoretical argument that the internal hierarchy of government elites again begins to reflect the

social stratum of the former regime in the regime consolidation phase. Particularly, the ranks of

elites whose fathers were middle- and higher-ranked elites in the former regime were extremely

concentrated in the regime consolidation phase, which suggests that former middle- and higher-

ranked elites gained their ranks in the new regime only because of their high social strata in the

former regime.

<Figure 2 should be here>

To examine the impact of social strata in the former regime on the intra-elite hierarchy

in the new regime, we draw a two-way graph between fathers' social strata in the former regime

(f_class_i) and the sons' ranks in the new regime ($rank_i$) (See Figure 3). This graph is deduced

by calculating the prediction for $rank_i$ from a linear regression of f_class_i on $rank_i$ and

plotting the resulting curve along the 95 percent confidence interval of the mean (solid/dash lines

and gray zones). The solid line indicates the ones in the regime transition phase ($phase_i = 0$) while the dash line indicates the ones in its consolidation phase ($phase_i = 1$). Figure 3 shows that the slopes of both lines were positive; however, the slope angle in the regime consolidation phase became steeper than the one in its transition phase. Similarly, the confidence interval of the mean in the transition phase became narrower than the one in its transition phase. The empirical results support our theoretical expectation that social strata in the former regime influenced sons' ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy throughout the process of the regime change, but the impact becomes stronger in the new regime than in its transition phase.

<Figure 3 should be here>

In order to measure the impacts of their fathers' social strata in the former regime on the internal hierarchy of government elites that we have discussed, we estimate the following ordered probit regression models[21]:

$$\Pr(rank_i = j) = \Pr(\kappa_{j-1} < \beta_1\, f\_class_i + \beta_2\, phase_i + \beta_3\, birthdate_i + u_i \leq \kappa_j)$$

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[21] Since all variance inflation factor (VIF) values are less than three, we infer that there is no multicollinearity problem in each model.

where u_i is assumed to be normally distributed; in either case, we estimate the coefficients β_1,

β_2, β_3 together with cutpoints $\kappa_1, \kappa_2,..., \kappa_{69}$; κ_0 is taken as $-\infty$, and κ_{70} is taken as $+\infty$.

…Model 1

$$\Pr(rank_i = j) = \Pr(\kappa_{j-1} < \beta_1\, f_{class\,i} + \beta_2\, phase_i + \beta_3\, birthdate_i + \beta_4\, edu\_oversea_i$$

$$+\beta_5\, edu\_phd_i + \beta_6\, edu\_ba_i + \beta_7\, edu\_highschool_i + \beta_8\, f\_connection_i + u_i \le \kappa_j)$$

where u_i is assumed to be normally distributed; in either case, we estimate the coefficients β_1,

$\beta_2, ..., \beta_8$ together with cutpoints $\kappa_1, \kappa_2, ... , \kappa_{69}$; κ_0 is taken as $-\infty$, and κ_{70} is taken as $+$

∞.

…Model 2

Model 1 is the baseline model and Model 2 the extensive version. In addition, we estimate Model

3 and Model 4 that include interactive terms between $phase_i$ and other independent variables

except $birthdate_i$ for each Model 1 and 2 in order to see the changes in each impact over phases

of the regime change. The estimated coefficients of each model are reported in Table 3.

<Table 3 should be here>

On comparing the estimated coefficients in Table 3 with the theoretically predicted

effects, we observe three striking findings. First, all models predict that fathers' social strata in the

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former regime (f_class_i) positively affected sons' ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy. Focusing on the interaction term with phases of the regime change ($f\_class_i \times phase_i$) in Models 3 and 4, we find that the influence of the social strata in the former regime on the intra-elite hierarchy in the new regime becomes stronger in the regime consolidation phase than in its transition phase.

Our second empirical result is that on introducing all interaction terms, the educational background ($edu\_oversea_i, edu\_phd_i, edu\_ba_i,$ and $edu\_highschool_i$) positively influenced their ranks in the new intra-elite hierarchy in the earlier phase but the significance of the education merit diminished later on. This suggests that that the challenger (or the new government) recruits activists with high ability out of the non-elite strata and assign them to higher-level positions based on their abilities in the regime transition phase rather than in its consolidation phase. We need to note the share of the elites whose latest degree was bachelor increased from 23.4% in the regime transition phase to 41.9% in the regime consolidation phase while the distribution of other educational background variables changed slightly from the regime transition phase to the consolidation phase. This suggests that although having a bachelor's degree helped people acquire elite membership, it did not guarantee them top ranks of the elites.

Lastly, we find that the connection with the challengers against the Tokugawa regime ($f\_connection_i$) had a positive impact on the rank in the new inter-elite hierarchy but became weaker in the regime consolidation phase. This empirical result suggests that the influence of the rebels against the Tokugawa *Shogunate* declined gradually in the regime consolidation phase.

Additionally, we divide the elites into two – upper-ranked elites (*rank_i* >32.75 (the mean value of this variable) and lower-ranked elites (*rank_i* <32.75) – and check the difference between them. Table 4 reports the estimated results for each model by each group.

<Table 4 should be here>

A study of the estimated results for the upper-ranked elites reveals that fathers' social strata in the former regime had a positive impact on sons' ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy. This impact became stronger in the regime consolidation phase rather than in the transition phase. Second, educational background negatively influenced the ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy except the experience of overseas study, and even the impact of overseas study became weaker in the consolidation phase. These suggest that the upper elite ranks were likely to be determined based on family roots and not individual ability. If ordinary people study hard, they might have an opportunity to join the upper-ranked elite group, but it would be difficult to reach to the top in this upper society. On the

other hand, the most important factor influencing the upward move in the lower-ranked elite group was to earn a bachelor's degree from imperial universities or imperial military college while the significant influence of fathers' social strata in the former regime disappears in the Model 3 and 4.

Summarizing, these additional analyses demonstrate that regime change caused people with high ability to join the new elite group and obtain middle ranks in the intra-elite hierarchy regardless of their family roots. However, this principle did not apply to the top ranks of this hierarchy. Top ranks of the elite hierarchy were determined according to each family's original social strata in the former regime and this tendency became clearer in the consolidation phase than in the transition phase.

Robustness Checks

To check the robustness of our results, we conduct three additional analyses. First, to examine the adequacy of our "phase" dichotomization, we divide the people by their birth years (per 4 and 5 years) and estimate the arranged version of Model 2 that excludes an independent variable, *phase*. Table 5 and 6 show that although the estimated coefficients of *f_class* continuously increased throughout the time, the increasing speed accelerated from the late 1960s to the early 1970s.

<Table 5 and 6 should be here>

Second, we also consider a general problem to the age of elites: young people still have

the opportunity to get promoted to a higher rank, while retired/ dead people generally do not. We

focus on the people listed in Jinji-Koshin-Roku volume 4 published in 1915, obtain their ranks in

1928 from Jinji-Koshin-Roku volume 8, and examine the models again by their upgraded

ranks, $rank_i'$. (Note that if we cannot find the same person in volume 8, we fill the rank in 1915

instead.) The results reported in Table 7 basically support the former results. The coefficient of the

interaction between *f_class* and *phase* is 0.08 with 5.5 percent significance in Model 3, but when

we control for other independent variables, the coefficient becomes significant. On the other hand,

the effects of high school level educational background and fathers' connection with the new

regime significantly become weaker ($edu\_highschool_i \times phase_i$, $f\_connection_i \times phase_i$) in

period 1, and although it is not significant, the coefficients of the interactions of the other

educational background with phase are also negative.

<Table 7 should be here>

To examine the first and second issues in more detail, we check the contrasts of

predictive margin of upper-ranked elites versus commoners and lower-ranked elites (*samurai*) with

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95% confidential level by birth year, using both the original rank in 1915 and the updated rank in

1928. The results are summarized in Figure 4. The figure shows the tendency that the difference

between them became clearer after mid 1860s.

<Figure 4 should be here>

Lastly, we create a dependent variable, $rank_i'$, that combines the 70 ranks of $rank_i$

into four ranks by cutting each quantile and estimate the coefficients for each model (see Table 8)

as well as check the marginal effects for Model 4 (see Figure 5). The results reported in Table 8

and Figure 5 confirm the former outcomes: the positive impact of fathers' classes becomes stronger

($f\_class_i \times phase_i$) in the phase 1 while the positive impacts of all educational backgrounds and

fathers' connection with the new regime weaken ($edu\_oversea_i \times phase_i$, $edu\_phd_i \times$

$phase_i$, $edu\_ba_i \times phase_i$, $edu\_highschool_i \times phase_i$, $f\_connection_i \times phase_i$).

<Table 8 should be here>

<Figure 5 should be here>

CONCLUSION

Despite its significance for regime change and state building, the question of how the influence of

regime change on elite group shifts over time has not received significant scholarly attention.

Using detailed individual-level data from the Meiji Restoration, Japan, we analyzed the changes in the social, political, and educational backgrounds of political elites over the phases of regime change, i.e. the regime transition phase and the regime consolidation phase and demonstrated elite reproduction dynamics. Several significant findings have emerged. First, while fathers' social strata in the feudal society had a positive influence on the positions of political elites, it was smaller in the regime transition phase than in the regime consolidation phase. This implies that the proportion of elites whose fathers were elites in the former regime was low in the regime transition phase but increased in the regime consolidation phase. Second, the positive impact of educational background on the positions of political elites was larger in the regime transition phase than in the regime consolidation phase. Third, while the elites whose fathers' hometowns were the four feudal domains initiating the Meiji Restoration (*Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen*) tended to have higher political positions, the impact of this hometown connection factor was larger in the regime transition phase than in the regime consolidation phase. Fourth, the percentage of political elites whose fathers were commoners in the feudal society increased in the regime consolidation phase.

These findings are important both theoretically and empirically. First, to our knowledge, this is the first study to explore the mobility and continuity of political elites over political regime

change, focusing on the difference between them in the regime transition phase and the regime consolidation phase, based on a large set of individual-level data. It was revealed that the mobility and continuity of elites indeed changed from the regime transition phase to the consolidation phase.

Second, this study contributes to the understanding of the regime change. As stated above, Tilly (1978) noted that the extent of the coalition between members of the polity and the contenders is essential for the success or failure of a revolution. This study supports and enriches this view by showing the overtime change in the continuity and mobility of elites. The findings above suggest that the Meiji government initially recruited activists with high ability out of the non-elite strata, particularly from the four feudal domains initiating the Meiji Restoration and assigned them to higher-level positions. In this sense, in the regime transition phase, the political coalition was narrowly focused and power sharing was limited, which arguably enabled the overthrow of the old regime successfully. They then strengthened the coalition with the old elites to consolidate the new regime. Power sharing with the elites of the former regime facilitates consolidation of the new regime, but this should occur after overthrowing the former regime.

Meanwhile, the number of government elites whose fathers were commoners in the feudal society kept increasing throughout the process of regime change, although the access to

high positions in the hierarchy for these commoners became narrowed after the regime transition phase due to the resilience of the old elites. Barriers preventing commoners from accessing the elite group were thus steadily lowered in the process of regime change. It can be interpreted as a part of the strategy of the government in the regime consolidation phase to extend power sharing.

A regime change may arouse people's desire to climb the ladder of power even if the new governments do not intend to democratize. One reason is that they see some people become elites from the non-elite strata. These success cases may raise the question of "why them and not me [us]?" among many other non-elites (Silberman 1993, pp.173-174). In addition, the new government needs to increase public spending for establishing the new regime. The government has many tasks such as management of new administrations, counterinsurgency operation, and reestablishment of diplomatic relations with other countries, all of which cost a significant amount of money. To complete these tasks, they need to collect taxes from people. Tax payment may increase people's demand for participation in politics. When faced with these demands from the masses, the challenger may have to compromise with them. Establishment of legislature and expansion of franchise are the prototypical examples of such a compromise. Even dictators may establish a legislature, which is merely a custom in many cases though, for his or her regime

survival (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001, 2005; Conley and Temimi 2001; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lizzeri and Persico 2004). Although the new elite hierarchy is not identical to the one before the regime change, elite reproduction dynamics does occur after a regime change.

APPENDIX

Kyuchu-Sekiji (Internal Hierarchy for Government Elites)

<Table A1 should be here>

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Figure 1 Elite Membership

Figure 2 Intra-elite Hierarchy (Box Graph)

Graphs by phase

Figure 3 Intra-elite Hierarchy (Fitted Line)

Figure 4

Note: The upper two graphs are estimated by the rank in 1915 and the lower two graphs are estimated by the updated rank in 1934

Figure 5

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variables

	N of observations	N of observations for 0	N of observations for 1
$phase_i$	2980	1776	1204
$edu\_oversea_i$	2980	2431	549
edu_phd_i	2980	2575	405
edu_ba_i	2980	2060	920
$edu\_highschool_i$	2980	2539	441
$f\_connection_i$	2979	2545	434

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Other Variables

	N of observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
rank$_i$	2980	32.75	9.64	1	70
f_class$_i$	2980	2.04	0.97	1	4
birthdate$_i$	2980	1865.04	11.03	1828.10	1911.10

Table 3 Estimated Effects of Fathers' Social Strata on Government Elites' Ranks

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
f_class_i	0.64*** (0.021)	0.65*** (0.023)	0.48*** (0.031)	0.52*** (0.032)
$phase_i$	-0.33*** (0.057)	-0.33*** (0.057)	-0.86*** (0.092)	-0.13 (0.143)
$birthdate_i$	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.04*** (0.003)	-0.04*** (0.003)
$edu\_oversea_i$		0.19*** (0.057)		0.32*** (0.070)
edu_phd_i		0.04 (0.071)		0.19** (0.086)
edu_ba_i		-0.05 (0.049)		0.13** (0.065)
$edu\_highschool_i$		0.02 (0.058)		0.27*** (0.074)
$f\_connection_i$		0.37*** (0.053)		0.52*** (0.066)
$f\_class_i \times phase_i$			0.30*** (0.041)	0.21*** (0.044)
$edu\_oversea_i \times phase_i$				-0.36*** (0.120)
$edu\_phd_i \times phase_i$				-0.47*** (0.157)
$edu\_ba_i \times phase_i$				-0.48*** (0.107)
$edu\_highschool_i$ $\times phase_i$				-0.71*** (0.126)
$f\_connection_i \times phase_i$				-0.45*** (0.111)
N	2980	2979	2980	2979
Log likelihood	-7643.31	-7607.54	-7616.17	-7545.00

*** $p<0.01$; ** $p<0.05$; * $p<0.10$; standard errors in parentheses

Table 4 Estimated Effects of Fathers' Social Strata on Government Elites' Ranks by Upper and Lower Ranked Elite Groups

	Upper Ranked Elites ($rank_i$ >32.75)				Lower Ranked Elites ($rank_i$ <32.75)			
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
f_class_i	0.25***	0.24***	0.16***	0.15***	0.21***	0.16***	0.13	0.10
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.079)	(0.080)
$phase_i$	0.17*	0.18**	-0.46***	-0.35	-0.01	-0.04	-0.23	-0.22
	(0.901)	(0.091)	(0.174)	(0.250)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.189)	(0.222)
$birthdate_i$	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.04***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
$edu\_oversea_i$		0.32***		0.43***		0.14		0.16
		(0.777)		(0.086)		(0.089)		(0.133)
edu_phd_i		-0.30***		-0.38***		0.39***		0.24
		(0.995)		(0.108)		(0.116)		(0.163)
edu_ba_i		-0.16**		-0.20**		0.26***		0.23**
		(0.073)		(0.089)		(0.082)		(0.107)
$edu\_highschool_i$		0.04		0.01		0.05		0.23*
		(0.079)		(0.0935)		(0.096)		(0.134)
$f\_connection_i$		0.22***		0.23***		0.04		-0.07
		(0.070)		(0.067)		(0.091)		(0.138)
$f\_class_i \times phase_i$			0.25***	0.23***			0.15	0.10
			(0.058)	(0.067)			(0.106)	(0.109)

$edu\_oversea_i \times phase_i$				-0.59***				-0.04
				(0.202)				(0.179)
$edu\_phd_i \times phase_i$				0.29				0.25
				(0.321)				(0.240)
$edu\_ba_i \times phase_i$				0.16				0.04
				(0.166)				(0.171)
$edu\_highschool_i \times phase_i$				0.03				-0.29
				(0.182)				(0.203)
$f\_connection_i \times phase_i$				-0.49***				-0.04
				(0.169)				(0.179)
N	1590	1590	1590	1590	1390	1389	1389	
Log likelihood	-3440.95	-3442.20	-3431.93	-3404.45	-2573.17	-2555.64	-2572.23	

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

Table 5 Estimated Effects of Fathers' Social Strata on Government Elites' Ranks by 5 Birth-year Group

Birth year	~1849	1850~1854	1855~1859	1860~1864	1865~1869	1870~1874	1875~1879	1880~
f_class_i	0.35***	0.44***	0.45***	0.51***	0.59***	0.76***	1.06***	0.99***
$birthdate_i$	-0.07***	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08**	-0.10***	-0.07	-0.06	0.03
$edu\_oversea_i$	0.65	0.23	0.73***	0.22	-0.08	-0.01	0.02	0.16
edu_phd_i	-0.33	0.41	0.16	0.07	0.28	-0.15	-0.33	0.45
edu_ba_i	-0.49	0.01	0.29	0.40***	0.03	-0.11	-0.53	-0.65
$edu\_highschool_i$	0.42	0.52	0.52***	0.23	-0.05	-0.57***	-0.46	0.19
$f\_connection_i$	0.76***	0.98***	0.10	0.21	0.07	0.12	0.21	0.16
N. of Obs.	229	234	388	510	648	531	214	225

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

Table 6 Estimated Effects of Fathers' Social Strata on Government Elites' Ranks by 4 Birth-year Group

Birth year	~1849	1850~1853	1854~1857	1858~1861	1862~1865	1866~1869	1870~1873	1874~1877	1879~
f_class_i	0.35***	0.44***	0.40***	0.50***	0.58***	0.58***	0.74***	0.97***	1.04***
$birthdate_i$	-0.07***	-0.07	-0.09	-0.03	-0.04	-0.08	0.09	-0.26***	0.02
$edu\_oversea_i$	0.65	0.31	0.47**	0.66***	-0.11	0.02	0.06	-0.10	0.12
edu_phd_i	-0.33	0.20	0.26	0.19	0.26	0.15	-0.02	-0.58	-0.20
edu_ba_i	-0.49	-0.13	0.11	0.49***	0.32**	-0.04	0.02	-0.79***	-0.27
$edu\_highschool_i$	0.42	0.52	0.72***	0.39	0.15	-0.17	-0.47**	-0.64	0.07
$f\_connection_i$	0.76***	1.10***	0.09	0.21	0.25	0.11	0.13	0.28	0.09
N. of Obs.	229	174	283	371	467	485	456	228	286

*** $p<0.01$; ** $p<0.05$; * $p<0.10$; standard errors in parentheses

Table 7 Estimation of models in Table 3 using the data from Jinji-Koshin-Roku volume 8 (1928)

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
f_class_i	0.43*** (0.020)	0.49*** (0.021)	0.39*** (0.030)	0.44*** (0.031)
$phase_i$	-0.08 (0.055)	-0.10 (0.055)	-0.21** (0.087)	-0.03 (0.127)
$birthdate_i$	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)
$edu\_oversea_i$		0.32*** (0.056)		0.37*** (0.070)
edu_phd_i		0.45*** (0.069)		0.47*** (0.084)
edu_ba_i		0.19*** (0.047)		0.24*** (0.063)
$edu\_highschool_i$		0.12*** (0.055)		0.28*** (0.071)
$f\_connection_i$		0.34*** (0.052)		0.51*** (0.066)
$f\_class_i \times phase_i$			0.08 (0.039)	0.08** (0.042)
$edu\_oversea_i \times phase_i$				-0.14 (0.117)
$edu\_phd_i \times phase_i$				-0.04 (0.149)
$edu\_ba_i \times phase_i$				-0.12 (0.100)
$edu\_highschool_i \times phase_i$				-0.39*** (0.116)
$f\_connection_i \times phase_i$				-0.48*** (0.108)
N	3181	3180	3181	2979
Log likelihood	-8435.41	-8337.64	-8433.58	-7545.00

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

Table 8 Estimated Effects of Fathers' Social Strata on Government Elites' Ranks Combined into Four Levels

| Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
f_class_i	0.57*** (0.0230	0.57*** (0.025)	0.38*** (0.033)	0.41*** (0.034)
$phase_i$	-0.56*** (0.063)	-0.55*** (0.063)	-1.19*** (0.104)	-0.39** (0.160)
$birthdate_i$	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.04*** (0.003)	-0.04*** (0.003)
$edu\_oversea_i$		0.14** (0.063)		0.28*** (0.077)
edu_phd_i		0.08 (0.078)		0.32*** (0.093)
edu_ba_i		-0.14*** (0.0535)		0.03 (0.070)
$edu\_highschool_i$		0.04 (0.064)		0.27*** (0.080)
$f\_connection_i$		0.32*** (0.058)		0.46*** (0.072)
$f\_class_i \times phase_i$			0.35*** (0.045)	0.23*** (0.049)
$edu\_oversea_i \times phase_i$				-0.38*** (0.138)
$edu\_phd_i \times phase_i$				-0.73*** (0.178)
$edu\_ba_i \times phase_i$				-0.45*** (0.118)
$edu\_highschool_i \times phase_i$				-0.70*** (0.140)
$f\_connection_i \times phase_i$				-0.42*** (0.125)
N	2980	2979	2980	2979
Log likelihood	-3556.23	-3527.40	-3526.53	-3464.28

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

Table A1 *Kyuchu-Sekiji* (Internal Hierarchy for Government Elites)

Rank	Current and former post	Title	Award			
			Kunto (Order of Merit)	*Ikai* (Court Rank)	*Kokyu* (Merit Grade)	Honorary Post
1			*Daikun'i* (Grand Cordon of the Order)			
2	Prime Minister					
3	President of the Privy Council					
4	Veterans of Restoration treated as Minister					
5	Marshal, Minister, Minister of the Imperial Household, Minister of the Interior					
6	Governor-General of Korea					
7	Former Prime Minister, former President of the Privy Council					
8	Former Minister, Former Minister of the Imperial Household, Former Minister of the Interior					
9	Vice President of the Privy Council					
10	Army General, Navy General, Privy Council					
11	Official appointed by the Emperor					
12	Speaker of the House of Peers, Speaker of the House of Representatives					

#						
13			First Order (Special)			
14					First Class	
15	Former official appointed by the Emperor					
16		Duke				
17				Junior First Rank		
18			First Order (others)			
19	Senior Official Level 1					
20	Deputy Speaker of the House of Peers, Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives					
21						Person entitled to enter into *Jako* Room
22		Marquess				
23				Second Rank		
24	Senior Official Level 2					
25					Second Class	
26						Person entitled to enter into *Kinkei* Room
27	Person treated as imperial appointee					
28		Earl				
29				Junior Second Rank		
30			Second Order			
31		Viscount				
32				Third Rank		

33				Junior Third Rank	
34					Third Class
35			Third Order		
36		Baron			
37				Fourth Rank	
38				Junior Fourth Rank	
39	Member of House of Peers, Member of the House of Representatives				
40	Senior Officer Level 3				
41	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 3				
42					Fourth Class
43			Fourth Order		
44				Fifth Rank	
45				Junior Fifth Rank	
46	Senior Officer 4				
47	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 4				
48					Fifth Class
49			Fifth Order		
50				Sixth Rank	
51	Senior Officer Level 5				
52	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 5				
53				Junior Sixth Rank	

	Officer	Order	Rank	Class
54		Sixth Order		
55	Senior Officer Level 6			
56	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 6			
57			Seventh Rank	
58	Senior Officer Level 7			
59	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 7			
60			Junior Seventh Rank	
61				Sixth Class
62	Senior Officer Level 8			
63	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 8			
64	Senior Officer Level 9			
65	Person treated as appointee with the Emperor's approval			
66			Eighth Rank	
67				Seventh Class
68		Seventh Order		
69			Junior Eighth Rank	
70		Eighth Order		

Note: Rank in this table refers to the original rank in *Kyuchu-Sekiji*. As stated in the main text, we made the variable "$rank_i$" by (70-Rank), so that the larger number of rank indicates the higher position.