

**Mobility and Continuity of Political Elites over Phases of Regime Change:  
Case of Meiji Restoration Japan<sup>\*</sup>**

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**Abstract**

Despite its significance for regime change and state building, the impact of regime change on elite group has not received adequate scholarly attention. Using the newly constructed 2,979 government elites' data after the Meiji Restoration in Japan, this paper shows that the uprising camp changes the strategies used to recruit political elites from the regime transition phase to its consolidation phase. Dividing the elites into the pre- and post-Meiji-Restoration born groups, we analyze how the membership and internal ranking of political elites shifted over phases of the regime change and state building. Two main findings emerged: (1) barriers preventing commoners' access to the elite group were steadily lowered throughout the process and (2) once the transfer of power was achieved, the new government reintegrated old elites into the elite group, and the intra-elite hierarchy again reflected the social stratum of the former regime.

Keywords: Regime Change, Social Mobility, Elites, Japan, the Meiji Restoration

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## INTRODUCTION

Although all regimes consist of those who govern and those who are governed, social mobility can fulfill poor people's dream of becoming elites. Scholars have focused on this social mobility as far back as Alexis De Tocqueville's *De la démocratie en Amérique (Democracy in America)* (1835); Pareto's elite circulation theory (1916), which argues that elites in one regime are replaced by other elites when regimes change; and Schumpeter's elite reproduction theory (1919), which emphasizes path dependency and casts doubts on social mobility. These studies have inspired a century of work that broadly considers mobility during regime change. However, the presence or absence of social mobility during regime change continues to remain a matter of dispute. For example, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Moore (1966) insist that regime change influences elite mobility while Clark (2014), Gerber (2000), Hankiss (1990), and Szelényi and Szelényi (1995) argue that there is no such influence. To our knowledge, one problem of most existing studies is that they only compare before and after the regime change, owing to which little attention has been devoted to how each phase of regime change influences elite mobility differently. How does elite mobility, particularly the mobility of government elites, change from the regime transition phase to the phase of consolidating a new regime?

We argue here that the answer to this question can be found in the change in elite recruitment strategies of the rebels (or the new governments) for overthrowing the incumbent regime, establishing a new regime, and consolidating the new regime. When attempting to overthrow the existing regime, the uprising camp, which is establishing a new regime, recruits talented activists from the non-elite strata and assigns them to higher-level positions based on their abilities to challenge the elites of the existing regime. In this phase, the uprising camp attempts to exclude the incumbent elites from politics and expropriate their lands, goods, and servants to weaken their power. When a transfer of power is achieved, however, alleviating the discontent with the new regime becomes the primary concern of the uprising camp. There are two targets: the masses and the former elites. To garner public support, barriers preventing access to the elite group are steadily lowered in the process of regime change. However, the new government simultaneously also attempts to reintegrate old elites into the new elite group to foster a sense of security among the former elites. Therefore, as not only former commoners but also former elites increase their participation in the new regime, the internal hierarchy of political elites comes more extensively reflect the social stratum of the former regime. We assess these hypotheses empirically using new data on 2,979 government elites since the Meiji Restoration

Japan (1868), which transformed Japan from a feudal and authoritarian state with a rigid social class system to a modern, liberal, and inclusive state by the end of the nineteenth century.

## **GOVERNMENT ELITE MOBILITY OVER PHASES OF REGIME CHANGE**

Why do some revolutions fail? How do rebels establish a new regime? When does a civil war end? Why is a nondemocratic regime replaced by a democracy? Many distinguished scholars have engaged with these questions but their main focus has been on the arrangements of institutions and policies that determine reallocation or redistribution of public goods, private resources, or seats in the legislature. The question of how these new arrangements affect the elite group has not received adequate scholarly attention. In the remainder of this paper, by dividing regime change process into the regime transition phase and the phase of consolidating the new regime, we extend the knowledge derived from those existing studies to an account of the impact of regime change on elite continuity and mobility.

We examine elite continuity and mobility with a focus on the two dimensions: elite membership and inner-elite hierarchy. Although an individual might obtain elite membership, if that individual has no possibility of upward mobility in the concerned structure of elites, he or

she might experience a sense of frustration. Many bureaucrats, military officers, politicians, or businessmen from private enterprises are not satisfied with the membership of the organizations that they are affiliated to but regardless struggle to attain higher positions in their inner hierarchies. Government elites at regime change are no exception. One suggestive study by Laski (1928) focusing on the United Kingdom's history from the 19th to 20th century shows that franchise expansion did not affect the composition of the cabinet members but that it might change the British parliament's composition in the long run.<sup>1</sup> The openness of lower-ranked elite society does not necessarily imply openness of upper-ranked elite society. Therefore, distinguishing between elite membership and inner-elite hierarchy is essential to understand elite mobility.

### **Elite Mobility in the Regime Transition Phase**

A regime change can arise from four actors' initiatives: foreign enemies who seek to control the country's governance; incumbent political leaders who seek to change their own regime in order to retain their political power; rivals within the current political order; and domestic non-elite

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<sup>1</sup> Laski's argument is supported by Guttsman (1951) and Berlinski et al. (2014).

activists who wish to overthrow the incumbent regime. According to Smith et al. (2003), if these dissatisfied actors have prospect of entering or staying in the winning coalition, they might not need to adopt risky means. If they do not have such prospects, however, they may orchestrate a revolution or a civil war to overthrow the current regime. How do the regime changes involved in civil war or revolution affect the ruling elite membership and the hierarchy among those government elites? Our focus is on such drastic regime changes initiated by the rebels within the country, and hence the regime changes initiated by incumbent political leaders or foreign enemies are not the subject of this study.

The first step in regime change is to overthrow the incumbent regime. To do this, the rivals within the existing political order or non-elite activists outside of the order may have to plot a revolution or win a civil war. Tilly (1978) notes how to complete a revolution as follows:

It is the formation of coalitions between members of the polity and the contenders advancing exclusive alternative claims to control over the government. The relationship is actually curvilinear: If no such coalition exists, that diminishes the chance that the revolutionary coalition will win—that there will be any transfer of power at all. However,

if the coalitions are extensive, the revolutionary settlement will tend to restore the previous status quo. The wise revolutionary who wishes to produce a large transfer of power forms the minimum necessary coalition with existing members of the polity, and forces his coalition partners to break irrevocably with other members of the polity (Tilly 1978, 213).

According to Tilly's argument, the uprising camps are not expected to allow many incumbent elites to join their group in the regime transition phase. Examining the regime change by a new dictator, Albertus and Menaldo (2012) argue that the new dictator expropriates to survive the uncertainty that besets him or her upon taking power, and large-scale expropriation early in the process of the regime change helps dictators maintain their power. The compromise with the existing or original government elites, therefore, hinders the success of overthrowing the incumbent regime. Instead, the uprising camps attempt to weaken their power by excluding the incumbent elites from politics and expropriating their lands, goods, and servants.

To contend against the incumbent elites and establish the new regime, the uprising camps must gather allies and staff members because they are a minority within the current

political order. Therefore, in this phase, even activists from the non-elite social classes have an opportunity to join the government elite group and be assigned to higher-level positions based on their abilities. Consequently, during the regime transition phase, the number and proportion of political elites from the incumbent elite group joining the new elites is low, and the intra-elite hierarchy is determined regardless of their social status.

### **Elite Mobility in the Phase of Consolidating the New Regime**

Following the achievement of complete transfer of power, however, the primary aim of the uprising camps shifts from overthrowing the outgoing regime to alleviating the discontent with the newly established regime. Since the 1990s, a growing number of scholars who have examined regime change from an authoritarian regime to a democracy and those who have examined regime change from a democracy to an authoritarian regime, have discussed how a new regime can be consolidated. Linz and Stepan (1996), one of the distinguished studies on democratic consolidation, explain the essence of new regime consolidation in one sentence: “Democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political group seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 4).



The literature that examines how a dictator establishes a new regime also agrees about the necessity to diminish the fear of exclusion among people in order to establish loyalty, solicit cooperation, and/or deter threat of rebellion (e.g. Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Smith et al. 2003). With whom then do the new governments have to compromise for regime consolidation? They have two targets: the former elites and the masses.

Elites from the old regime have the potential power to threaten the new regime or to legitimize the regime even following the transfer of power. All existing literature agrees that regime change cannot be explained without accounting for these former elites. Most literature on democratization agree that compromises by elites are essential for the consolidation or stability of democracy (e.g., Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992; Higley and Burton 1989; Higley and Moore 1981; Huntington 1984, 1991; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Levine 1978; Linz 1978; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Peeler 1985; Przeworski 1986; Rustow 1970; Sartori 1987; Wilde 1978). Scholars who explore the birth of authoritarian regimes also argue that new dictators should foster a sense of security among former elites to consolidate the new regime after overthrowing the old regime (e.g. Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and

Przeworski 2007; Smith et al. 2003; Svolik 2009). Civil war studies such as Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) confirm as well that institutions to facilitate power-sharing perpetuate the peace in the aftermath of a civil war.

The old elites' fear is simple: they are afraid of losing their wealth, social status, and lives. How can new governments mitigate their fears? Scholars claim that the answer is the establishment of systems to ensure that the old elites have veto power (e.g. Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; North and Weingast 1989; Svolik 2009; Wright 2008). Typical examples of these arrangements are the establishment of Privy Council, the House of Peers, a military junta, and a nobility system. These new institutions facilitate the integration of the former elites into the new elite group, which increases the share of elites from the former elite class in the regime consolidation phase although their share in the regime transition period is low.

The other target is the masses. Even some activists engaged in the democratization process might hesitate to pursue full democracy partly because poor people's demand for resources may threaten their own assets and statuses (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2006; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 2003; Kocka 2010) and partly because new governments no

longer have an urgent need to find top leaders from the non-elite strata once the desired new regime is established. The elites of the former regime and the core members, who worked to overthrow the former regime, demand high positions in the new government. Thus, the upward mobility of the internal elite hierarchy or the possibility of non-elites reaching the top of the elite hierarchy reduces.

Nonetheless, a regime change arouses the people's desire to climb the ladder of power even if the new governments do not intend to democratize. One reason is that they see some people become elites from the non-elite strata. These success cases raise the question of "why them and not me [us]?" among many other non-elites (Silberman 1993, 173-174). This pressure becomes stronger in particular when the new governments need to mobilize the masses to overthrow the old regime. The other reason is that many governments need to increase public spending for establishing the new regime. New governments have many tasks such as management of new administrations, counterinsurgency operation, and reestablishment of diplomatic relations with other countries, all of which cost a significant amount of money. To complete these tasks, it is necessary to collect taxes from people. Tax payment increases people's demand for participation in politics. When faced with these demands from the masses, new

governments have to compromise with them. Establishment of legislature and expansion of franchise are the prototypical examples of such a compromise. Even dictators may establish a legislature, which is merely a custom in many cases though, for his or her regime survival (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001, 2003; Conley and Temimi 2001; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lizzeri and Persico 2004). In addition, many governments guarantee people more freedom to access higher education, choose occupations, and get married to a person of their choice regardless of their social strata. As a result, new governments lower barriers preventing access to the elite group steadily even after they have reduced the urgency of the need to recruit talented people from the non-elite strata.

Overall, mobility of elite membership and internal hierarchy among elites change from the regime transition phase to the regime consolidation phase. The uprising camps recruit new elites to contend against incumbent elites during the regime transition phase, while they recruit new elites to alleviate the dissatisfaction of the masses and the former elites with the new regime during the consolidation phase. Therefore, by comparing an elite's status in the new regime with his/her father's status in the former regime, we form the following hypotheses and examine the change in elites' mobility over phases of a regime change.

With regard to elite membership,

Hypothesis 1: The proportion of elites with fathers from the relatively low class of the former regime steadily increases throughout the process of regime change.

Hypothesis 2: The proportion of elites with fathers from the elite class of the former regime is low in the regime transition phase but increases in the regime consolidation phase.

With regard to elite internal hierarchy,

Hypothesis 3: The intra-hierarchy of elites more intensively reflects the social structure of the former regime than in the regime transition phase.

## **DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS**

### **Meiji Restoration Japan, 1868**

We test these hypotheses focusing on the case of the Meiji Restoration Japan (1868). In 1868, a drastic political regime change, referred to as the Meiji Restoration, that occurred in Japan shifted the power from the Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji government under the authority of the Emperor who achieved rapid modernization and laggardly ushered in partial democracy by

the end of the century. The Meiji Restoration, therefore, marked Japan's revolution from a feudal and authoritarian state with a rigid social class system to a modern industrial nation-state with more liberty, albeit without the uprising from frustrated peasants and bourgeois in the English revolution and the French revolution (e.g., Banno 2012; Beasley 1972; Gluck 1985; Gordon 2003; Hoston 1991; Jansen 2002; Lockwood 1954; Mitani 2013; Moore 1966; Moulder 1977; Scalapino 1953; Trimberger 1978). Let us trace the history of the Meiji Restoration briefly.<sup>2</sup>

The Tokugawa Shogunate ruled Japan from the early 15th century and enjoyed considerable prestige for two centuries. However, Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States arrived in Japan in 1853 and demanded that Japan be opened to trade. Although Japan had been sealed off to the outside world for the two centuries, the Tokugawa Shogunate agreed to his demand due to American military pressure and also signed treaties with the European powers. This forced opening of the treaty ports had an immediate impact on both economy and politics. The beginning of the trade caused sharp inflation. Consumers and producers were angered by the decision of the Tokugawa government. Additionally, the treaties demonstrating the Tokugawa government's inability to protect the country, resulted in lowering the reputation of the

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<sup>2</sup> For more information on the Meiji Restoration, see Banno (2012), Gordon (2003), Jansen (1989, 2002), and Mitani 2013.

government. At that time, the Shogun and other samurai who ruled Japan enjoyed political privileges because of being warriors. However, the incidents destroyed the authority of the Tokugawa Shogun for ruling the country. In this situation, feudal lords (*Daimyo*) of the outer domains that had been eliminated from the Tokugawa politics – Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen – and the middle- and lower-ranked samurai, many of who were from the above four domains became the core members of the rebels. In the process of overthrowing the Tokugawa regime, Japan had two small-scale and one-large scale civil wars. The first two wars were between the Tokugawa government and Choshu in 1861 and 1866. After these civil wars, the rebels finally could gain permission to overthrow the Tokugawa government from the Emperor, that despite not having substantial power after the 14<sup>th</sup> century, continued to retain the symbolic status as Japan's top leader. They began a civil war with the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868 that ended in 1869. Approximately 0.8-1.2 million people were mobilized in this civil war and fourteen thousand people died.

The first task for the uprising camp was to terminate the former regime. Therefore, the new government removed all traces of the Tokugawa Shogun from the castle in 1868, confiscated the lands and servants of the feudal lords (*Daimyo*) by 1872, and deprived the

privileges of the samurai such as the right to carry weapons in public and their salaries until mid-1870s. The government proceeded with a series of these reforms peacefully, pledging to pay salary to feudal lords for their whole lifetime and a lump-sum salary to other samurai. Some disaffected samurai rose in revolt against the new government until 1877 but the new government successfully quelled all revolts.

The new government also quickly granted liberty to the masses. The government newly allowed non-elite people to have a family name in 1870, and granted people the freedom to establish residence in any location they wanted, choose any occupation, and get married to anyone regardless of their social strata in 1871. The government also announced compulsory education for eight years in 1872. Nevertheless, most core members of the new government were negative about establishing the legislature and enfranchising the people. Additionally, the newly established bureaucracy consisted of staff selected based on informal criteria or connections with core government members. Therefore, at first, people had no formal access to become involved in politics or become government elites. Rather, they had to bear the heavy land taxes that the Meiji government newly established to address the huge costs such as the war costs for the civil war and the rebellions, the costs for industrialization, and the costs for paying salary to the



former feudal lords. Farmers who became frustrated with the heavy tax burden revolted repeatedly against the new government but the Meiji government suppressed them and only slightly decreased the tax rate.

Failures of samurai revolts and peasant riots in the 1870s showed that the Meiji government achieved to establish the new regime. As a result, people started the freedom and people's right movement to give voice to their feelings within the existing political framework instead of subverting it, by demanding the opening of the parliament and enfranchisement, and the Meiji government started to establish institutions and systems for consolidating the new regime. To address the people's frustration, the Meiji government promised to open a parliament and grant the franchise to the large taxpayers in 1881 and fulfilled the promises in 1890. In addition, the government formulated the first entrance examination rule for bureaucrats in 1887. This rule also made everyone who had obtained a bachelor of law or arts from the University of Tokyo, which was the first imperial university after the Meiji Restoration, eligible as a bureaucracy candidate without taking the entrance exam. Moreover, the Army War College was founded in 1882 and the Naval War College was established in 1888. These institutions gave everyone access to the government elite group regardless of birth. Meanwhile, the Meiji

government also institutionalized the new nobility system in 1884, the Privy Council in 1888, and the House of Peers in 1890 in order to garner the support of the former elites and ensure the privileges of both old and new elites. By the early 1890s, the government had thus succeeded in establishing the main governing institutions thus.

The Meiji Restoration is particularly advantageous for exploring elite membership and its internal hierarchy over phases of regime change. First, the post-Meiji Restoration government created a new internal hierarchy for government elites named *Kyuchu-Sekiji* – literally means “order of precedence in the emperor’s court” – that categorized the elites into 70 ranks. Therefore, we can precisely specify government elites in the new regime and their ranks in the new hierarchy. Second, we were able to collect detailed biographical information about the 2,979 political elites in the new regime from *Jinji-Koshin-Roku* (Who’s Who Record) volume 4 published in 1915 (Jinji Koshin-Jo 1915).<sup>3</sup> Obtaining text data using OCR technology,<sup>4</sup> we

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<sup>3</sup> *Jinji-Koshin-Roku* is known as a provider of the most credible who’s who record during the period, and scholars are in consensus about the relative reliability of their provided information (e.g. Aso 1978; Iwami et al. 1981; Takane 1976, 1981).

<sup>4</sup> To construct this dataset, Tomoko Masuda, Tomoya Sano, and Zhao Di greatly support us. We are particularly grateful for the technical help of Tomoya Sano.

could construct a database of all the persons listed in the record, which included detailed biographical information—not only about their own careers, education background, and ranks in the new elite hierarchy but also their fathers' home towns and social classes in the former regime—and we were able to measure intergenerational social mobility, comparing the relative statuses of fathers and sons.<sup>5</sup>

Many scholars have examined the influence of the Meiji Restoration on social mobility including that of elites, but they consider the changes to have occurred in one direction and did not examine the possibility of non-linear change (Allen and Donnithorne 1954; Bellah 1957; Clark and Ishii 2012; Fujita 1948; Harootunian 1959; Man'nari 1965; Moore 1966; Nakamura 1999; Silberman 1964; Skocpol 1979; Sonoda 1990; Sugano 1931; Takane 1976, 1981; Tominaga 1990; Tsuchiya 1954). In addition, their focus was primarily on elite membership and not the internal elite hierarchy that we examine in this paper. The following analyses, therefore, have added a new perspective to the literature of modern Japanese history.

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<sup>5</sup> We collected the information of the elites' biological fathers and not foster fathers.

## Data

To specify the government elites and their ranks in the inner-elite hierarchy, we use the order of precedence in the emperor's court (*Kyuchu-Sekiji*) established by the Imperial House Law Act (*Koshitsu-Rei*) Number 1 in 1915. The ranks of *Kyuchu-Sekiji* consisted of current and former posts, titles—the Royal and Noble Ranks (*Shakui*)— and awards that divided government elites into 70 ranks (See Appendix). Each title and award had been institutionalized before 1915 but this order arranged all ranks derived from them in the same line. The Royal and Noble Rank system was institutionalized in 1884 and these titles, divided into four ranks, were given to the old elites such as the Tokugawa Shogun and feudal lords (Daimyo), and the new elites who had rendered distinguished services to the Meiji government. These titles could be inherited by their descendants. Awards were divided into (1) *Kunto* (Order of Merit), (2) *Ikai* (Court Rank),<sup>6</sup> (3) *Kokyu* (Merit Grade) particularly for military, and (4) *Jako-no-Mashiko* and *Kinkei-no-Mashiko* (honorary posts entitled to enter into the special rooms in the Emperor's Palace. An individual such as a bureaucrat or a military man would be assigned an award corresponding to his or her

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<sup>6</sup> *Ikai* (Court Rank) was the most popular award (Fujii 1990) and offered to aristocrats, government officers, military men, imperial university professors, national school headmasters, and those that were given credit for Japan.

position, whenever he or she reached a higher post. Currently, the imperial ranks are only given to elder people but at that time, the awards were given immediately in principle.<sup>7</sup> These awards were principally guaranteed for a lifetime but could not be inherited by the descendants of the receiver. Therefore, these awards were indicative of the highest position that each elite has held in the new government.

We excluded the ranks derived from the current and former posts and selected only the ranks derived from awards and titles for the analyses. The reason is that awards and titles were principally guaranteed for a lifetime while current and former positions were unstable as well as could have been attained through elections that contradicted the emperor's will.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> For example, the chief judge of a district court was normally awarded the Fourth Order and the Fifth Rank. An army general was normally awarded the First Order and the Second Class, and some of them were awarded as the Grand Cordon of the Order and the First Class. Vice-ministers, the top position of civilian bureaucrats, were at least awarded the Third Order. The ambassadors at the big countries such as the UK, the US, Italy, Russia, and France were awarded the First Order.

<sup>8</sup> In 1915, 90 percent of the members of the House of Peers had received while a half of the members of the House of Representatives did not have any awards according to our database.

The analytical focus was on the new governments' strategies for elite recruitment, and *Kyuchu-Sekiji* is therefore ideal because it was determined by the Emperor; reflected the Emperor's intentions;<sup>9</sup> and included a variety of elites, such as bureaucrats, military leaders, businessmen, scholars, scientists, and cultural celebrities. Therefore, we assume that government elites were those who had been given titles or awards and create the dependent variable,  $rank_i \in [1, 70]$ ,<sup>10</sup> that records the highest rank each elite had.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Strictly speaking, we should distinguish emperors from governments; however, emperors were symbolic figures for the uprising camps that overthrew the former regimes, established new regimes, and consolidated them. Therefore, we use *Kyuchu-Sekiji* to indicate government elites. Additionally, Nishikawa (1996, 2002) argues that military personnel were more likely than civilians to obtain high-ranking posts. This ranking system could be considered a biased system, but what is notable is that the Emperor intentionally biased his appointments. This is meaningful because we can interpret it as a sign that emperors and the core members of the Meiji government valued support from the military more than they valued it from civilians.

<sup>10</sup> In the Imperial House Law, a low-numbered rank meant a high rank, but we refined the number from the higher to the lower for avoiding confusion. This means that  $rank_i$  is recorded as 71 minus the original rank.

<sup>11</sup> We follow Article 2 of the Imperial House Act No. 1, which determined that a person should take the highest-ranked seat if more than one rank was available. One problem with Takane (1976, 1981) is that he recorded elites' ranks inaccurately. He assumed that the more awards a

To compare the statuses of sons to their fathers, we identify the father's social stratum of each government elite in the former regime,  $f\_class_i$ . We divided the social strata in the former regime into four scales [1,4]: (a) higher-ranked elites (aristocrat and feudal lord) recorded as four,<sup>12</sup> (b) middle-ranked elites (higher-ranked *samurai*) recorded as three,<sup>13</sup> (c) lower-ranked elites (*samurai*) recorded as two,<sup>14</sup> and (d) non-elites (commoner) recorded as one.

To examine the difference between the regime transition phase and its consolidation phase, dividing government elites into the pre-Meiji-Restoration-born group and the person had, the higher was the position taken, which contradicts the contents of Article 2.

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<sup>12</sup> The category of aristocrats and feudal lords includes Shogun who was the military dictator of Japan in the former regime, Imperial families, feudal lords (*Daimyo*), and aristocrats who dominated the Japanese imperial court (*Kuge*).

<sup>13</sup> The category of higher-ranked *samurai* includes the upper vassals of the Tokugawa house (*Hatamoto*), feudal lords' relatives (*Hanshu-Ichimon*), and advisors of feudal lords (*Karō*).

<sup>14</sup> The category of *samurai* also includes *Shizoku*. More than half of the *samurai* in the Tokugawa Shogunate became re-categorized as *Shizoku* after the Meiji Restoration by an administrative order issued in 1869 (Yamaguchi 2000). The rest of the *samurai* were the people who chose to become commoners or were rejected because of their very low status in the *samurai* group. Therefore, we assume that most *Shizoku* were *samurai* in the former regime since it was nearly impossible that commoners in the former regime became *Shizoku* after the Meiji Restoration.

post-Meiji-Restoration-born group, we created a dummy variable  $phase_i$ , which takes value one, if an elite was born after 1867 and zero otherwise. The reason we differentiate the regime transition phase from its consolidation phase was that the government could not establish most nationwide institutions until the early 1890 as we have mentioned in Section 3.1. We considered 1890 to be the pivotal year because not only did these institutions consolidate the new regime but they also opened avenues for everyone to join the elite group. Before 1890s, people had to find a way to join the elite group by themselves. However, these institutions allowed all people, regardless of birth, to become bureaucrats as long as they passed the entrance exam or graduate from the University of Tokyo, to become military elites if they graduated from military schools and colleges with a good degree, or to become politicians if they won an election. At that time, the standard age for earning a bachelor's degree was 22 for medical students and 21 for others (Ministry of Education ed. 1981). Therefore, we assume that the people who started their career in the regime consolidation phase were born after 1867.

In addition, we created the following control variables. Concerning the educational background, an important variable is overseas study experience. Tokugawa Shogunate had a foreign policy that restricted the entry of foreigners and forbade the Japanese from leaving and



reentering Japan until 1866. Therefore, the people who had Western knowledge were rare and in demand for achieving modernization (Ishizuki 1972; Silberman 1964; Tsuji 2010; Watanabe 1977). We argue that the people who experienced study abroad were more likely to be promoted (Silberman 1964) and examine its effects using a dummy variable, *edu\_oversea<sub>i</sub>*, which takes value one, if an elite had experience of studying abroad and zero otherwise. Additionally, domestic education might have influenced their success (Aso 1978; Amano 1990; Iwami et al. 1981; Man'nari 1965; Takane 1976, 1981); hence, we create three more dummy variables to assess their latest academic background. These were based on whether elite was a PhD holder (*edu\_phd<sub>i</sub>*), whether one had a BA and/or a masters but not a PhD (*edu\_ba<sub>i</sub>*), and whether one graduated from a high school or higher-level school but not imperial universities (*edu\_highschool<sub>i</sub>*).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> During the time, only the imperial universities established after the regime change were able to offer students bachelor and PhD degrees, and other (higher) professional schools and private universities in Japan could offer neither. We also counted the bachelor and PhD degrees gained by foreign countries. In addition, we counted the people who had graduated from the Naval War College or Army War College in Japan as bachelor holders. We assume that if the record does not include any information regarding education background about a person, his or her educational level was less than high-school. For reference, before the regime change, no educational system

Additionally, we add the variable representing the father's hometown to see if the people from the four domains that initiated the Meiji Restoration had privileges. These four domains are *Satsuma*, *Choshu*, *Tosa*, and *Hizen*,<sup>16</sup> and the people from these domains were generally believed to gain some privileges (e.g. Silberman 1964; Takane 1976, 1981). We, therefore, create a dummy variable,  $f\_connection_i$ , which takes a value of one if the father of an elite was from one of those four domains and zero otherwise. Lastly, we add a variable for each elite's birth date,  $birthdate_i$ ,<sup>17</sup> to control for the effect of the Confucian sense of seniority.

We extracted the above information from the Who's Who Record (*Jinji-Koshin-Roku*) volume 4 published in 1915. A total of 3,612 government elites, in the sense defined above, were included in this record, and for 2,981 of them, we were able to obtain information about their

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could confer a degree although there were schools that taught Confucianism or Western knowledge.

<sup>16</sup> Japan abolished the previous domain system and instead introduced a new system of prefectures in 1871. Kagoshima prefecture included most area of Satsuma domain, Yamaguchi prefecture included most of Choshu domain, Kochi prefecture included most of Tosa domain, and Saga prefecture included most of Hizen domain. Therefore, we record both the elites whose fathers were from the four domains and the ones whose fathers were from these four prefectures.

<sup>17</sup> We record birth year (yyyy), month (mm), and day (dd) as "yyyy.mmdd."

fathers' social classes in the former regime from the record. For 2,980 of them except one, the data of their birth dates were available as well. We can check the coverage of our data set by comparing it with the number of people who had titles and awards in the previous year, 1914, from the official government data provided by the Bureau of Statistics in the Cabinet Office (*Naikaku-Tokeikyoku* 1926). It is confirmed that 77 percent of the people who had titles in 1914 are included in our 2,980 observations. Regarding *Ikai* (Court Rank), 60 percent of the people who had Junior Fourth Rank or higher are included.

Table 1-a summarizes the distribution for dummy variables, and Table 1-b summarizes descriptive statistics for the other variables.

<Table 1-a should be here>

<Table 1-b should be here>

### **Elite Membership**

What kind of people joined the elite group and how did their membership change over phases of regime change? Figure 1 shows the composition of the social stratum of the fathers of the

pre-Meiji-Restoration-born elites compared with those of the post-Meiji-Restoration-born elites in order to analyze the change in the elite membership owing to the regime change.

<Figure 1 should be here>

We find that the share of the elites whose fathers were lower-ranked elites (*samurai*) was more than 60 percent in the regime transition phase, while their share became reduced in its consolidation phase. This reflects that they led the Restoration, although they declined in influence during its consolidation phase.

On the other hand, in the regime consolidation period, their share declined substantially, while the sons of the higher-ranked elites of the old regime (feudal lords and aristocrats) as well as the sons of the non-elites (commoners) increased. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2 that barriers preventing access to the elite group are steadily and continuously lowered in the process of regime change; on the contrary, the rebels against the Tokugawa regime or the new governments act differently toward elites during phases of regime change. They first contend against these elites in order to overthrow the incumbent regime while they reintegrate these elites into their new elite group after establishing the new regime in order to alleviate their dissatisfaction against the new regime and gain their support.

## INTERNAL HIERARCHY OF ELITES

Let us move on the next question: how does social strata in the former regime influence the internal ranking of elites and how does the impact change over phases of regime change? We draw box plots of government elites by phases of the regime change over their fathers' social strata (See Figure 2). We find that overall, the higher the social stratum of one's father in the former regime, the higher one's own rank in the new regime. Moreover, both boxes and whiskers in the regime transition phase were larger than those in its consolidation phase. This supports our theoretical argument that the internal hierarchy of government elites again begins to reflect the social stratum of the former regime in the regime consolidation phase. Particularly, the ranks of elites whose fathers were middle- and higher-ranked elites in the former regime were extremely concentrated in the regime consolidation phase, which suggests that former middle- and higher-ranked elites gained their ranks in the new regime only because of their high social strata in the former regime.

<Figure 2 should be here>

To examine the impact of social strata in the former regime on the internal elite hierarchy in the new regime, we draw a two-way graph between fathers' social strata in the former regime ( $f\_class_i$ ) and the sons' ranks in the new regime ( $rank_i$ ) (See Figure 3). This graph is deduced by calculating the prediction for  $rank_i$  from a linear regression of  $f\_class_i$  on  $rank_i$  and plotting the resulting curve along the 95 percent confidence interval of the mean (solid/dash lines and gray zones). The solid line indicates the ones in the regime transition phase ( $phase_i = 0$ ) while the dash line indicates the ones in its consolidation phase ( $phase_i = 1$ ). Figure 3 shows that the slopes of both lines were positive; however, the slope angle in the regime consolidation phase became steeper than the one in its transition phase. Similarly, the confidence interval of the mean in the transition phase became narrower than the one in its transition phase. The empirical results support our theoretical expectation that social strata in the former regime influenced sons' ranks in the internal elite hierarchy throughout the process of the regime change but the impact becomes stronger in the new regime than in its transition phase.

<Figure 3 should be here>

In order to measure the impacts of their fathers' social strata in the former regime on the internal hierarchy of government elites that we have discussed, we estimate the following ordered probit regression models<sup>18</sup>:

$$\Pr(\text{rank}_i = j) = \Pr(\kappa_{j-1} < \beta_1 f\_class_i + \beta_2 phase_i + \beta_3 birthdate_i + u_i \leq \kappa_j)$$

where  $u_i$  is assumed to be normally distributed; in either case, we estimate the coefficients  $\beta_1$ ,

$\beta_2, \dots, \beta_3$  together with cutpoints  $\kappa_1, \kappa_2, \kappa_3$ ;  $\kappa_0$  is taken as  $-\infty$ , and  $\kappa_4$  is taken as  $+\infty$ .

...Model 1

$$\Pr(\text{rank}_i = j) = \Pr(\kappa_{j-1} < \beta_1 f\_class_i + \beta_2 phase_i + \beta_3 birthdate_i + \beta_4 edu\_oversea_i + \beta_5 edu\_phd_i + \beta_6 edu\_ba_i + \beta_7 edu\_highschool_i + \beta_8 f\_connection_i + u_i \leq \kappa_j)$$

where  $u_i$  is assumed to be normally distributed; in either case, we estimate the coefficients  $\beta_1$ ,

$\beta_2, \dots, \beta_8$  together with cutpoints  $\kappa_1, \kappa_2, \kappa_3$ ;  $\kappa_0$  is taken as  $-\infty$ , and  $\kappa_4$  is taken as  $+\infty$ .

...Model 2

Model 1 is the baseline model and Model 2 the extensive version. In addition, we estimate Model 3 and Model 4 that include interactive terms between  $phase_i$  and other independent variables

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<sup>18</sup> Since all variance inflation factor (VIF) values are less than three, we infer that there is no multicollinearity problem in each model.

except  $birthdate_i$  for each Model 1 and 2 in order to see the changes in each impact over phases of the regime change. The estimated coefficients of each model are reported in Table 2.

<Table 2 should be here>

On comparing the estimated coefficients in Table 2 with the theoretically predicted effects, we observe three striking findings. First, all models predict that fathers' social strata in the former regime ( $f\_class_i$ ) positively affected sons' ranks in the internal elite hierarchy. Focusing on the interaction term with phases of the regime change ( $f\_class_i \times phase_i$ ) in Models 3 and 4, we find strong empirical support for Hypothesis 3 that the influence of the social strata in the former regime on the internal elite hierarchy in the new regime becomes stronger in the regime consolidation phase than in its transition phase.

Our second empirical result is that on introducing all interaction terms, the educational background ( $edu\_oversea_i$ ,  $edu\_phd_i$ ,  $edu\_ba_i$ , and  $edu\_highschool_i$ ) positively influenced their ranks in the new internal-elite hierarchy although the impact became weaker in the regime transition phase. This suggests that the uprising camps (or the new government) recruit talented activists out of the non-elite strata and assign them to higher-level positions based on



their abilities in the regime transition phase rather than in its consolidation phase, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3.

Lastly, we find that the connection with the uprising camps against the Tokugawa regime ( $f\_connection_i$ ) had a positive impact on the rank in the new inter-elite hierarchy but became weaker in the regime consolidation phase. This empirical result suggests that the influence of the rebels against the Tokugawa Shogunate declined gradually in the regime consolidation phase.

Additionally, we divide the elites into two – upper-ranked elites ( $rank_i > 32.75$  (the mean value of this variable)) and lower-ranked elites ( $rank_i < 32.75$ ) – and check the difference between them. Table 3 reports the estimated results for each model by each group.

<Table 3 should be here>

A study of the estimated results for the upper-ranked elites reveals that fathers' social strata in the former regime had a positive impact on sons' ranks in the internal elite hierarchy. This impact became stronger in the regime consolidation phase rather than in the transition phase. Second, educational background negatively influenced the ranks in the inner-elite hierarchy except the experience of overseas study, and even the impact of overseas study became weaker

in the consolidation phase. These suggest that the upper elite ranks were likely to be determined based on family roots and not individual ability. If ordinary people study hard, they might have an opportunity to join the upper-ranked elite group but it would be difficult to reach to the top in this upper society. On the other hand, the most important factor influencing the upward move in the lower-ranked elite group was to earn a bachelor's degree from imperial universities or imperial military college while the significant influence of fathers' social strata in the former regime disappears in the Model 3 and 4.

Summarizing, these additional analyses demonstrate that regime change caused talented people to join the new elite group and obtain middle ranks in the inner elite hierarchy regardless of their family roots. However, this principle did not apply to the top ranks of this hierarchy. Top ranks of the elite hierarchy were determined according to each family's original social strata in the former regime and this tendency became clearer in the consolidation phase than in the transition phase.

## CONCLUSION

Despite its significance for regime change and state building, the question of how the influence of regime change on elite group shifts over time has not been a topic of significant scholarly

attention. Literature of regime change has shed little light on the impact of regime change on elite group, and most scholars studying social mobility at regime change have not distinguished the short-term impact from the long-term one, assuming that the impact is linear. Focusing on the case of the Meiji Restoration Japan (1868), however, we acquired a different answer: uprising camps or new governments have different recruitment strategies for political elites between the regime transition and consolidation periods. First, in order to contend against the elites of the incumbent regime, the rebels against the Tokugawa regime or the Meiji government recruited talented activists out of the non-elite strata and assigned them to higher-level positions based on their abilities. As a result, we found that the number of political elites in the new regime whose fathers were elites in the old regime became low in the generation, and the intra-elite hierarchy was determined based on competence such as educational background regardless of social statuses. On achieving a transfer of power, however, new governments' primary concern shifted to alleviating the discontent with the new regime. They had two trenches: the masses and the former elites. To garner public support, barriers preventing access to the elite group were steadily lowered in the process of regime change. Therefore, the number of government elites whose fathers were commoners continuously increased throughout the process of regime change.

However, the new governments also attempted to reintegrate old elites into the new elite group at the same time to gain support from the former elites. The share of the political elites whose fathers were former elites was low at first, but this share significantly increased in the regime consolidation phase. The internal hierarchy of political elites again began to reflect the social stratum of the former regime while the impact of each competence on the intra-elite hierarchy weakened, particularly in the upper-ranked elite group. Summarizing, non-elites could join the elite group more easily in the regime consolidation phase but it also simultaneously became more difficult for them to be promoted to a higher position in the internal hierarchy of elites.

These findings are important theoretically and empirically. First, to the extent of our knowledge, this is the first study to explore the mobility and continuity of political elites over political regime change, focusing on their difference between the regime transition phase and the regime consolidation phase, based on a large set of individual-level data. It was revealed that the mobility and continuity of elites indeed changed from the transition phase to the consolidation phase. The process of regime change, therefore, should be divided into and analyzed as those two phases separately.

Second, this finding was confirmed by studying the intra-elite hierarchies as well as elite membership. This study demonstrated that elite membership and intra-elite hierarchies are distinct and equally important aspects of regime change for understanding elite mobility and continuity. In the case of the Meiji Restoration, fewer non-elites joined the new regime's elites during the transition phase than during the consolidation phase, although they could have been given high-ranking positions in the internal hierarchy based on their abilities. More non-elites joined the elites of the new regime during the consolidation phase, but it was not as easy to obtain high positions in the hierarchy. Many non-elite people might become satisfied with lowering barriers to prevent access to the elite group in the regime consolidation phase because such lowering offers them the opportunity to dream about them or their children becoming elites; however, the ambitious people who actually managed to join the elite group might be disappointed on facing another barrier preventing them from reaching the top of the intra-elite hierarchy and experience a lesser sense of elite mobility.

Finally, this study contributes to the understanding of the regime change. As we stated above, Tilly (1978) pointed out that the extent of the coalition between members of the polity and the contenders is essential to the success or failure of a revolution. This study supports and

enriches this view by showing the overtime change in the continuity and mobility of elites in the Meiji Restoration. In the transition phase the coalition was weak, which enabled the contenders to overthrow the old regime. They then strengthened the coalition with the old elites to consolidate the regime. Power sharing with the elites of the former regime facilitates consolidation of the new regime but this should happen after overthrowing the former regime. If rebels overly compromise with the former elites before overthrowing the incumbent regime, they might face the opposition from these elites and might fail the attempt itself.

## APPENDIX

### ***Kyuchu-Sekiji (Internal Hierarchy for Government Elites)***

<Table A1 should be here>

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
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Kyoiku Shinkokai, 104-113.

Figure 1 Elite Membership



Graphs by phase

Figure 2 Internal Elite Hierarchy (Box Graph)




Figure 3 Internal Elite Hierarchy (Fitted Line)




Table 1-a Descriptive Statistics for Dummy Variables

	N of observations	N of observations for 0	N of observations for 1
<i>phase<sub>i</sub></i>	2980	1776	1204
<i>edu_oversea<sub>i</sub></i>	2980	2431	549
<i>edu_phd<sub>i</sub></i>	2980	2575	405
<i>edu_ba<sub>i</sub></i>	2980	2060	920
<i>edu_highschool<sub>i</sub></i>	2980	2539	441
<i>f_connection<sub>i</sub></i>	2979	2545	434

Table 1-b Descriptive Statistics for Other Variables

	N of observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
$rank_i$	2980	32.75	9.64	1	70
$f\_class_i$	2980	2.04	0.97	1	4
$birthdate_i$	2980	1865.04	11.03	1828.10	1911.10

Table 2 Estimated Effects of Fathers' Social Strata on Government Elites' Ranks

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
$f\_class_i$	0.64*** (0.021)	0.65*** (0.023)	0.48*** (0.031)	0.52*** (0.032)
$phase_i$	-0.33*** (0.057)	-0.33*** (0.057)	-0.86*** (0.092)	-0.13 (0.143)
$birthdate_i$	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.003)	-0.04*** (0.003)	-0.04*** (0.003)
$edu\_oversea_i$		0.19*** (0.569)		0.32*** (0.070)
$edu\_phd_i$		0.04 (0.071)		0.19** (0.086)
$edu\_ba_i$		-0.05 (0.049)		0.13** (0.065)
$edu\_highschool_i$		0.02 (0.058)		0.27*** (0.074)
$f\_connection_i$		0.37*** (0.053)		0.52*** (0.066)
$f\_class_i \times phase_i$			0.30*** (0.041)	0.21*** (0.044)
$edu\_oversea_i \times phase_i$				-0.36*** (0.120)
$edu\_phd_i \times phase_i$				-0.47*** (0.157)
$edu\_ba_i \times phase_i$				-0.48*** (0.107)
$edu\_highschool_i \times phase_i$				-0.71*** (0.126)
$f\_connection_i \times phase_i$				-0.45*** (0.111)
N	2980	2979	2980	2979
Log likelihood	-7643.31	-7607.54	-7616.17	-7545.00

\*\*\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

Table 3 Estimated Effects of Fathers' Social Strata on Government Elites' Ranks by Group

	Upper Ranked Elites ( $rank_i > 32.75$ )				Lower Ranked Elites ( $rank_i < 32.75$ )			
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
$f\_class_i$	0.25*** (0.028)	0.24*** (0.032)	0.16*** (0.036)	0.15*** (0.039)	0.21*** (0.053)	0.16*** (0.054)	0.13 (0.079)	0.10 (0.080)
$phase_i$	0.17* (0.901)	0.18** (0.091)	-0.46*** (0.174)	-0.35 (0.250)	-0.01 (0.090)	-0.04 (0.090)	-0.23 (0.189)	-0.22 (0.222)
$birthdate_i$	-0.04*** (0.003)	-0.04*** (0.003)	-0.04*** (0.003)	-0.04*** (0.003)	-0.03*** (0.006)	-0.03*** (0.006)	-0.03*** (0.006)	-0.03*** (0.006)
$edu\_oversea_i$		0.32*** (0.777)		0.43*** (0.086)		0.14 (0.089)		0.16 (0.133)
$edu\_phd_i$		-0.30*** (0.995)		-0.38*** (0.108)		0.39*** (0.116)		0.24 (0.163)
$edu\_ba_i$		-0.16** (0.073)		-0.20** (0.089)		0.26*** (0.082)		0.23** (0.107)
$edu\_highschool_i$		0.04 (0.079)		0.01 (0.0935)		0.05 (0.096)		0.23* (0.134)
$f\_connection_i$		0.22*** (0.070)		0.23*** (0.067)		0.04 (0.091)		-0.07 (0.138)
$f\_class_i \times phase_i$			0.25*** (0.058)	0.23*** (0.067)			0.15 (0.106)	0.10 (0.109)



<i>edu_oversea<sub>i</sub> × phase<sub>i</sub></i>				-0.59*** (0.202)				-0.04 (0.179)
<i>edu_phd<sub>i</sub> × phase<sub>i</sub></i>				0.29 (0.321)				0.25 (0.240)
<i>edu_ba<sub>i</sub> × phase<sub>i</sub></i>				0.16 (0.166)				0.04 (0.171)
<i>edu_highschool<sub>i</sub> × phase<sub>i</sub></i>				0.03 (0.182)				-0.29 (0.203)
<i>f_connection<sub>i</sub> × phase<sub>i</sub></i>				-0.49*** (0.169)				-0.04 (0.179)
N	1590	1590	1590	1590	1390	1389	1389	
Log likelihood	-3440.95	-3442.20	-3431.93	-3404.45	-2573.17	-2555.64	-2572.23	

\*\*\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

Table A1 *Kyuchu-Sekiji* (Internal Hierarchy for Government Elites)

Rank	Current and former post	Title	Award			
			<i>Kunto</i> (Order of Merit)	<i>Ikai</i> (Court Rank)	<i>Kokyu</i> (Merit Grade)	Honorary Post
1			<i>Daikun'i</i> (Grand Cordon of the Order)			
2	Prime Minister					
3	President of the Privy Council					
4	Veterans of Restoration treated as Minister					
5	Marshal, Minister, Minister of the Imperial Household, Minister of the Interior					
6	Governor-General of Korea					
7	Former Prime Minister, former President of the Privy Council					
8	Former Minister, Former Minister of the Imperial Household, Former Minister of the Interior					
9	Vice President of the Privy Council					
10	Army General, Navy General, Privy Council					
11	Official appointed by the Emperor					
12	Speaker of the House of Peers, Speaker of the House of Representatives					
13			First Order (Special)			

14			First Class	
15	Former official appointed by the Emperor			
16		Duke		
17			Junior First Rank	
18		First Order (others)		
19	Senior Official Level 1			
20	Deputy Speaker of the House of Peers, Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives			
21				Person entitled to enter into <i>Jako</i> Room
22		Marquess		
23			Second Rank	
24	Senior Official Level 2			
25			Second Class	
26				Person entitled to enter into <i>Kinkei</i> Room
27	Person treated as imperial appointee			
28		Earl		
29			Junior Second Rank	
30		Second Order		
31		Viscount		
32			Third Rank	
33			Junior Third Rank	

34			Third Class
35		Third Order	
36	Baron		
37			Fourth Rank
38			Junior Fourth Rank
39	Member of House of Peers, Member of the House of Representatives		
40	Senior Officer Level 3		
41	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 3		
42			Fourth Class
43		Fourth Order	
44			Fifth Rank
45			Junior Fifth Rank
46	Senior Officer 4		
47	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 4		
48			Fifth Class
49		Fifth Order	
50			Sixth Rank
51	Senior Officer Level 5		
52	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 5		
53			Junior Sixth Rank
54		Sixth Order	

55	Senior Officer Level 6		
56	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 6		
57		Seventh Rank	
58	Senior Officer Level 7		
59	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 7		
60		Junior Seventh Rank	
61			Sixth Class
62	Senior Officer Level 8		
63	Person treated as Senior Officer Level 8		
64	Senior Officer Level 9		
65	Person treated as appointee with the Emperor's approval		
66		Eighth Rank	
67			Seventh Class
68		Seventh Order	
69		Junior Eighth Rank	
70		Eighth Order	

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Note: Rank in this table refers to the original rank in *Kyuchu-Sekiji*. As stated in the main text, we made the variable " $rank_i$ " by (70-Rank), so that the larger number of rank indicates the higher position.